I begin this article with two quotes. The first is from Thomas Sowell who said:
“You will never understand bureaucracies until you understand that for bureaucrats, procedure is everything and outcomes are nothing.”
And the second quote is extracted from a verse in Lord Alfred Tennyson’s epic poem, ‘The Charge of the Light Brigade’.
“…Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die.
Into the Valley of Death
Rode the six hundred…”
History has placed the onus of the debacle in the Battle of Balaclava on 25 Oct 1854, immortalised by Lord Alfred Tennyson as the “Charge of the Light Brigade,” entirely on misinterpretation of orders. Many, including this author, tend to somewhat disagree.
Facing 20 Russian infantry battalions and 50 artillery pieces in the ‘Valley of Death’ between the Fedyukhin and Causeway Heights, a misinterpreted order should not have resulted in the blind following of standard battle drills, tradition and procedures as were, sacrificing around 156 (some estimates say 237) of the 670 immensely brave and loyal, but lightly armed horsemen, in the process.
Closer home, in 1962, an intact 1 MADRAS, that had been bypassed by the Chinese on the Eastern shoulder of Bomdila, was suitably poised to create mayhem for the Chinese tail in conjunction with 3 JAK RIF, by laying several platoon-sized ambushes. Instead, in the absence of orders, the battalion chose to follow the standard procedure to withdraw to a new defensive line/main position. The battalion got ambushed during the withdrawal and ceased to be effective, thereafter. In addition to those killed, the battalion had 254 men taken prisoners of war (including the CO) or missing.
Conversely, in 1971, the Indian Sword that struck erstwhile East Pakistan (as termed by Maj Gen LS Lehl) achieved dividends out of proportion by exploiting fleeting opportunities and out of the box thinking. On the Western front, at the tactical level, 10 PARA raided Chachro, 80 km inside Pakistan territory, breaking most rules in the book and created history in the process.
Most tradition-bound armies lay immense stress on formalising Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for every conceivable operational and administrative drill, and following it to the ‘T’. There are considerable advantages of this norm if interpreted and executed wisely. The aforesaid examples amplify the need to reconsider excessive stress on following SOPs verbatim, especially in tactical military situations and operational art.
This achieves all the more significance today as warfare enters Hybrid, Asymmetric, Unrestricted and Unconventional domains.
Connotation of SOP
‘Today, when something goes wrong, if you had followed the SOP verbatim, you’re asked, “As an officer and leader, why didn’t you apply yourself?” and if you had applied yourself, the inevitable question is, “Why didn’t you follow the SOP?”’
-Thoughts of a perturbed Commanding Officer
‘Standard (Standing, as some call it) Operating Procedure’ or SOP for short, is a set of step by step instructions compiled by an organisation to help employees carry out complex routine operations to achieve efficiency, quality output and uniformity of performance while reducing miscommunication and failure to comply with regulations. It is not clear whether the term was coined by the industry or the military.
Whereas following SOPs is most essential and non-negotiable for the industry, where imponderables and variables in the production process are negligible, the adoption of standard procedures by the military, without adequate thought, needs caution.
Extrapolating the definition of SOP into a military context, SOPs lay down ‘a’ way of carrying out tactical drills or executing administrative tasks, based on past experience within a specific set of conditions; in short, the quintessential Indian Army ‘Tartib’. In units, they are priceless for executing daily routine and peacetime activities efficiently eg parades of various kinds, training activities, etc, as also establishing a broad framework of battle procedures and drills.
Since ‘Tartib’ is most essential for troops to standardise responses to similar situations, the Indian Army, understandably, has insisted on generating SOPs for each and every conceivable aspect of peacetime duties and events. To ease training and facilitate understanding of battlefield responses to tactical situations, this has extended into warlike activities as well.
However, over a period of time, over-stressing on SOPs rather than encouraging understanding and analysis of situations, has affected combat leadership significantly, particularly at the junior levels.
The US Army Manual ATP 3-90.90 (Army Tactical SOP) gives the operational take on SOPs stating that “An SOP is a set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardised procedure without loss of effectiveness. … the benefits of SOPs are numerous. They enhance effective execution of tasks, …reduce training time, … commission of errors, omission of essential steps and the time required for completion of tasks. …This does not mean, however, that carrying out SOPs never requires thought…”
The implication of blind faith in SOPs
“… the Standard Operating Procedure liberal is really a giant ignoramus. I mean that seriously. They are really ignorant.”—Rush Limbaugh
Israel’s success in all its wars till the 1973 Yom Kippur War, demonstrated out of the box thinking and situationally appropriate actions, resulting in its adversaries biting the dust each time. In 1973, their infiltration of armour on rafts across the Suez Canal North of the Great Bitter Lake and forming infantry-tank small teams in enemy’s depth, achieved the destruction of Egyptian assets, especially radar and SAM sites, beyond expectations.
However, the same Army was considerably mauled by the irregular Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War in 2006 by being predictable, unprepared for asymmetric warfare and fighting on the enemy’s terms. “… For the first time in Israel’s history, a war ended not through Israeli fire and manoeuvre against an enemy force, but by a political agreement ‘which permitted it to stop a war which it had failed to win.’”
Whereas following SOPs is most essential and non-negotiable for the industry, where imponderables and variables in the production process are negligible, the adoption of standard procedures by the military, without adequate thought, needs caution.
Adding to its tactical defeat, the IDF suffered significant damage to over 50 Merkava Mk 2/3/4s (with at least 20 destroyed), as the IDF remained in a counter-terrorism profile, while the Hezbollah had escalated the confrontation to ‘conventional levels in an asymmetric backdrop’.
It has been widely experienced that in conventional and counter-terrorism operations, SOPs tend to make cutting edge Junior Leaders refrain from independent thought. SOP bound troops are predictable, which is counter-productive in CI/CT operations and along active borders. A cunning and innovative enemy can wreak havoc by constantly taking advantage of the other side’s commitment to SOPs, mutually agreed norms and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).
Blind adherence to SOPs is like fighting the last war, that can and will be exploited by the enemy. Our unpredictable and hegemonist northern neighbour always seeks to occupy more and more territories, demolishing all CBMs, agreements and Rules of Engagement, that, over a period of time have become SOPs for our forces.
It just goes to show that SOPs need to be backed by realism, ISR inputs and the ability to speedily carry out mid-course corrections. This has been demonstrated by the brilliant action South of Pangong Tso, by the Indian forces, in August 2020.
As one responsible for the conduct of several, Reconnaissance& Surveillance, Young Officers, Combat Team Commanders and Combat Group Commanders Courses over two years, this author sadly experienced numerous instances of templated, inadequately thought through responses to tactical situations. Most plans or situational responses by student officers were blindly based on formation and unit SOPs, with little thought to force multipliers available, opportunities to exploit enemy weaknesses or likely contingencies due to enhanced/irregular enemy capabilities.
A simple example will amplify the trend of templated reaction by Junior Leaders. One rule of tank battles taught across Armies and followed by most junior tank commanders is “armour never assaults armour”. The logic of this teaching is very clear – a well-sited, hull down tank is likely to hit two moving enemy tanks before it can be spotted and engaged, by when it could take out a third tank.
However, in situations where engagements may take place at close ranges with the enemy armour tucked in behind dunes, folds in the ground or cultivated areas, and own tanks caught in the open, shock action generated by charging onto the enemy armour with guns blazing may offer the only chance of survival.
Therefore, more apt teaching would be “armour never assaults armour unless it’s the only option to win the encounter”. This would also synchronise it with one, forever relevant Infantry SOP – “Dahine Dushman (Enemy to the right), charge” – the standard counter ambush drill.
The way out
“No plan survives the first contact with the enemy. What matters is how quickly the leader is able to adapt.”—Tim Harford (Adapted from Helmuth Von Moltke the Elder, 1800)
Centuries of military wisdom passed on to our forefathers convinced them that no two situations, both, on and off the battlefield, are entirely similar, let alone identical. This originated the application of the factors with the acronym METTT – Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops (Resources) and Time – to battlefield SOPs, drills and procedures, to arrive at the appropriate course of action.
Whereas a deliberate appreciation does consider these factors, format bound junior leaders, unfortunately, rely more on SOPs during quick mental appreciations for rapid responses to battlefield situations. This amounts to disaster in the face of an enemy who has devoted adequate time to ‘knowing his enemy’.
It is evident that the all-encompassing Hybrid Warfare demands actions based on quick SWOT analysis, breaking into the enemy’s OODA loop by rapidly exploiting his weaknesses and known response methodologies while protecting his own vulnerabilities. This will cause mental paralysis and psychological dislocation of the enemy, creating conditions for his defeat. In execution of plans, SOPs practised during peacetime, intelligently modified by METTT analysis, will win the day.
Wise strategists prefer the art of manoeuvre, which is all about Mission-type Tactics, the German ‘Aufragstaktik’ – conveying the ‘why’ and ‘what’ of an operation (the outcome or result) to a subordinate commander, but never the ‘how’. It is this ‘how’ ie specifying the means to the end, that comprises the SOP. As Robert Greene says in his book, “33 Strategies of War”, leaders must Control the Dynamic, ie do not let people control you. This is feasible only if one isn’t format/SOP bound.
An Army’s battle drills and procedures are known as much to the adversary, as are to its own troops. Under no circumstances should the enemy be able to predict the next move of the commanders of the other side.
A nation like ours, facing a continuum of aggressive actions to weaken it by a particular emerging global power adept at Hybrid and Unrestricted Warfare, will need to be most flexible and imaginative in its retaliation. This will demand speedy reactions to a plethora of hitherto unheard of effect-based operations. Military SOPs may require some flexibility built into them (contrary to the term) to remain relevant in such combat scenarios due to the constantly changing milieu in many spectra.
Concluding thoughts
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, SOPs are worth their weight in gold for training purposes and routine peacetime activities. They generate cohesiveness in sub-units/units and form the basis of speedy reactions. Drill square procedures add to the coordinated response to command. However, in battlefield situations, oft practiced procedures may result in an SOP Trap if not suitably adapted to the extant situation.
This article, a tickler for vibrant young military minds, has restricted its scope to adherence to SOPs in the tactical domain. That does not take away the significance of mental agility in decision making from Operational Art. If a culture is ingrained in Junior Leaders/ Young Officers of suitably executing SOPs after considering all factors in the prevailing situation and applying appropriate modifications/corrections, it will become a habit for posterity.
Bibliography:
Tennyson, Lord Alfred. The Charge of the Light Brigade and Other Poems. 1992.
Verma, Shiv Kunal. 1962 The War That Wasn’t. 2016.
US Army Manual ATP 3-90.90 (Army Tactical SOP)
O’Ballance, Edgar. No Victor, No Vanquished. 1980.
Murphy, Lt Col Brian J. No Heroic Battles: Lessons of the Second Lebanon War. 2015.
Greene, Robert. The 33 Strategies of War. 2009
