It would perhaps not be out of context to refer to an out of the ordinary communiqué dated 05 November 2022 which suddenly came to the fore from the International Council of Naga Affairs with the NIA charge-sheeting of the “China-Myanmar” module of the NSCN (IM) for supporting the cadres of People’s Liberation Army (Manipur) and Kanglei Yawol KannaLup (KYKL).
Although it was innocuously titled “India, Myanmar and the Naga People: Unresolved Colonial Political Conflict” the statement—which was both detailed and closely written— conveyed a great deal of thought and lament about the issue pertaining to the Naga Peace Process and the chequered history of the movement.
Although much has been written about the Naga movement, Nirmal Nibedon’s Night of the Guerrillas being one of the most authoritative, a student of Naga insurrection can perhaps never completely exhaust the manner in which its pages turn and unfold. The statement of 05 November 2022 is one such curious addition to the treatise.
It is appealing because of the Myanmarese component that it incorporates. After all, few in even the corridors of power of New Delhi know about the way in which the Naga community snakes in and out of Myanmar and then tucks itself away from sight! Indeed, it is perhaps this lack of knowledge that has cost many an innocent lives including 18 bravehearts of 6 DOGRA who were ambushed by a group of terrorists belonging to the NSCN (Khaplang) and KYKL in Manipur’s Chandel on 04 June 2015.
This author had been to Yangon with an Indian delegation in 2014 for a “Track II Dialogue”. This was before the Chandel attack took place. In one of the sessions dedicated to security he had queried as to what Myanmar’s specific relation with NSCN (K) was. After all, New Delhi was, at the time, in a ceasefire mode with the Naga grouping. There was considerable disquiet in the hall as a result of the question, but the moot point was that Yangon did not consider NSCN (K) to be an insurgent group and had, as a matter of fact, got into an agreement with the outfit on 09 April 2012 in Hkampti well after New Delhi had signed a cessation of hostilities with the group in 2001.
This author had simply wanted to know the contours of Myanmar’s agreement with NSCN (K) because it had a bearing on the Naga Peace Process that was underway in India. The NSCN (K) has important footprints in Myanmar and although New Delhi had got into a ceasefire agreement with the organisation, there were mandarins in Raisina Hill who were of the opinion that there should be no dialogue with NSCN (K) because it was a Myanmarese Naga outfit and its leader was a Myanmarese national.
Much of such a narrow outlook, of course, stemmed from the fact that NSCN (K) was a rival faction of the prima donna among insurgent groups in the North East, NSCN (IM) and New Delhi was willing to bend backwards to appease it at all cost—even if it meant abrogation of ceasefire with NSCN (K) which eventually took place, leading to the ambush on the 6 Dogras and sundry other acts of violence.
Indeed, the question that has been uppermost in the mind of this author ever since the Chandel attack is why NSCN (K) could not been humoured to the extent that it could have continued with the ceasefire: much of the violence that followed could have perhaps been avoided!
The communiqué of 05 November 2022 had—in all fairness— unravelled this harsh truth. One of which is that even as India and Myanmar were on the path to gaining independence on 15 August 1947 and 04 January 1948 respectively, the Nagas of Myanmar had refused to sign the Panglong Agreement of 12 February 1947 which “was instrumental in forming the Union of Burma” and was the crucial step for providing “full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas” to some of the ethnic groups of Myanmar such as the Kachins.
In other words, the Nagas that inhabited the territory of Myanmar at the time of Burmese independence had not accepted the Bamar “consolidation” in any form or manner. The fact that it did enter into a bilateral agreement with Yangon in 2012 was an event that came rather late in the day. However, the hard truth is that there was—and continues to be—great puzzlement and dissonance in New Delhi about how to deal with the Naga issue in its entirety. As aforesaid, there is a section that is against speaking to NSCN (K) because of the group’s station in Myanmar and yet there are splinter factions of the original organisation that have entered into agreements with New Delhi.
In any event, the long and short of it is that there is utter confusion about the manner in which the Naga Peace Process would pan out in the coming days.
The Naga issue is not a matter that can be broad-brushed by seeking to appease a particular faction. Indeed, even NSCN (IM) has a formidable presence in Myanmar’s Somra Tracts with 34 Tangkhul villages and important camps in Heirenkot, Yowpi, Koki and Mayinlon. Now, are these Myanmarese Nagas? Definitely so, but they fall under the ambit of Camp Hebron that New Delhi has come into an agreement with. But, has New Delhi taken into account the possibility of what could befell it if NSCN (IM) cadres under, say the ranking leader in Myanmar, Absolom Tangkhul (Rambo) decides to stay on in Myanmar and out of an agreement with the parent NSCN (IM)? It would be a repeat of exactly what happened when NDFB entered into a ceasefire in May 2005, but its 3rd Battalion and chairman, Ranjan Daimary continued to stay on in Bangladesh and three years later perpetrating—at the behest of the ISI—the infamous serial blasts of 30 October 2008 all over Assam resulting in 81 deaths.
The fact that Rambo decided—with or without Camp Hebron’s knowledge—to allow his stronghold in Somra Tracts in Myanmar’s Sagaing Division as a thoroughfare for Meitei militants billeted in Myanmar is an old story. While the NIA charge-sheeting has brought into the open counter allegations by the NSCN (IM) that Indian security forces are aiding Kuki militants, it is the Naga Peace Process that is being seriously undermined.
Also, one wonders whether the proclivities and affiliations of the second rung of leadership in the NSCN (IM) have been correctly profiled by the Indian agencies. VS Atem is clearly the frontrunner in the event of Muivah’s exit, but there are leaders such as AK Lungalang, Phunting Shimran, RH Rising, Ningkhang Shimray, Anthony Shimray and others? What if they turn out to be even more vehement and rigid about aspects than Muivah is? As a matter of fact, some of these names are hardliners in NSCN (IM). Indeed, some of the important leaders in NSCN (IM) could well even have connections with China, Pakistan and such other forces inimical to India. It would be recalled that Anthony Shimray who is the Political Commissar of the NSCN (IM) was arrested in 2010, thirteen years after the ceasefire with NSCN (IM) in 1997 on charges of gun-running with a Chinese front company.
Thuingaleng Muivah completed 90 years on 03 March 2024. New Delhi must have a clear game plan in place to conclude the “strategic patience” in the Naga game. A comprehensive resolution for the longest running insurgency in the world should be one of the priorities for the new government.
