Introduction
Lieutenant Colonel Narindra Nath Khanna was born on 20 May 1928, in Hyderabad District of Sind province of Pakistan. His father worked at the Forest Research Institute, Dehradun. He joined IMA on 20 January 1947 and passed out with the Third Course on 12 September 1948. Incidentally, the Third Course holds the distinction of having earned five Maha Vir Chakras’ these are Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Krishnaswami Gauri Shankar, Major (later Lieutenant General) Ranjit Singh Dyal, Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) Desmond Hayde, Brigadier Mohinder Lal Whig and Lieutenant Colonel Narindra Nath Khanna.
Lieutenant Colonel NN Khanna was commissioned into the SIKH Regiment on 30 December 1948.On 05 May 1954 he married Miss Savitri Anand at Dehradun. They had three children Ashwani, Meera, and Anjani. During the 1965 War he was commanding 2 SIKH which was part of Operation Faulad in the PUNCH Sector of J&K.
Raja Picquet from Post 405, in 1997
The Terrain
Between Punch and Kahuta, there were many hill features which dominated the Punch–Haji Pir track. The enemy picquets located on these features had cement emplacement for MMGs and shell proof bunkers. All approaches to the picquets were covered by MMGs, guns and mortars. 93 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier Zora Singh under 25 Infantry Division commanded by Major General Amrik Singh launched Operation Faulad to achieve the Punch-Haji Pir link-up by capturing these picquets.
Among the picquets, Raja and Chand Tekri dominated the area to the East of the Betar Nallah, along which ran the track which linked Punch with Haji Pir Pass. These served as staging camps for infiltrators in the Punch Sector and therefore, it was considered necessary to capture them.
Operation Faulad : First Attack
On 02 September 1965, 3 DOGRA departed for its assembly area at the lower reverse slopes of Post 405. The local guide assigned to the Battalion intentionally led them off course, causing them to lose valuable time. Despite this setback, they eventually reached their position. Soon after, 2 SIKH also arrived at their designated assembly area. Both Battalions then settled in to wait out the daylight hours. Although Pakistani Observation Posts detected their
movement and carried out harassing fire, it was largely ineffective. Lieutenant Colonel Nair and Lieutenant Colonel Narindra Nath Khanna, the Commanding Officer of 3 DOGRA and 2 SIKH, attended a last-minute meeting with the Commander 93 Infantry Brigade, Brigadier Zora Singh before rejoining their respective battalions.
After last light, 3 DOGRA and 2 SIKH advanced and reached their respective Forward Assembly Areas by midnight. At 0430 hours on 02 September 1965, the two leading Companies of 3 DOGRA, led by Major Greesh Chandra Verma and Major Gurdev Singh Bawa, crossed the Start Line and, thirty minutes later, began engaging the Pakistani defenses. At 0515 hours, 2 SIKH was preparing to advance. However, just as they were about to move, they came under artillery fire for the next thirty minutes. Unsure of the situation, Lieutenant Colonel Khanna instructed Captain Anup Dharni of Charlie Company and Captain Surjit Singh of Delta Company to advance to the Northern slope of Raja, the 2 SIKH Forming Up Place (FUP). At 0600 hours, in the dim light before dawn, both Companies came under machine-gun fire from the direction of Raja.
The two SIKH Companies maintained their composure, stabilizing the line. However, it became evident that the attack by the Dogra’s had failed, leading to both Battalions being instructed to return to their assembly areas.
During the debriefing, Major Greesh Verma, described the defences of Raja as nearly impregnable. He explained that with additional covering fire from the Rani side exposing his flanks, he had no choice but to retreat. As the discussion shifted to planning the next steps, Lieutenant Colonel Khanna took the lead. He quietly assured Brigadier Zora Singh, “Give it to me, Sir. 2 SIKH will capture Raja.”
The Second Attempt
Lieutenant Colonel Khanna requested a minimum of two days to probe the defences and plan his next attack however, the scheduled date of 07 September was moved up by twenty-four hours after only one reconnaissance had been completed.
The roles were now reversed, with 3 DOGRA assigned to capture Rani before attacking and capturing Sur Tekri. 2 SIKH was tasked with capturing Raja. 75 Patiala Mountain Battery was to support 2 SIKH, while the Dogra’s were to be supported by the Heavy Mortar Battery. 42 Field Regiment was designated for counter-bombardment only. Flank support was to be provided by the Meghdoot Force under Major Megh Singh, which was also tasked with capturing Lambi Tekri.
By mid-morning on 05 September 1965, both Battalions had reached their forward assembly areas, and the soldiers were shown the objectives from Point 405, which was connected to Raja by a ridge. In the early hours of 06 September 1965, both Battalions departed for their respective FUP, and at 0505 hours, both assault Units crossed their start lines simultaneously.
The surprise attack on Rani by 3 DOGRA, held by a Company of 4 Azad Kashmir supported by a Platoon of 5 Zhob Militia caught the defenders off guard. Despite the loss of Major GC Verma and Captain GS Bawa—and a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO), Subedar Bansi Lal, along with fourteen other soldiers, 3 DOGRA continued their uphill assault and successfully captured Rani. Three officers, two JCOs, and sixty men were wounded in the action.
Capture of Raja
The defences at Raja appeared impregnable, explaining 3 DOGRA’s previous failure. As 2 SIKH crossed the Start Line, they faced intense enemy fire. Major Kailash Kalley, one of the Company Commanders, was incapacitated with a knee injury. The Artillery support from the Patiala Mountain Battery’s 3.7-inch howitzers and the RCL guns on Point 405 proved ineffective, with most shells falling short of Raja’s defences.
2 SIKH began taking heavy casualties almost immediately, indicating that the Pakistani forces were well-prepared for the advancing troops. With improving light conditions, the situation became more dire. Lieutenant Colonel NN Khanna displayed fearless leadership, motivating the Battalion to maintain pressure on the enemy, even in what appeared to be a hopeless situation.
Compounding the challenge, Major (later Lieutenant General) Jagdish Singh Virk, the Battery Commander, was instructed not to call in medium artillery support unless it was to engage enemy artillery, further limiting their options.
Lieutenant Colonel Khanna displayed extraordinary determination and bravery. Leading from the front, he urged his men to follow as he rushed forward. He single-handedly removed a picket holding the barbed wire marking the minefield. In a miraculous turn, he managed to navigate through the mines, although two of the men following him lost their feet in the explosion. Despite being hit for the first time, sustaining an injury to his arm, Lieutenant Colonel Khanna pressed on, getting close enough to the forward bunker to throw a grenade at it.
Despite the Sikhs’ success in closing the gap with the forward bunkers, they remained in a dire situation, pinned down by heavy enemy fire. Lieutenant Colonel Khanna then maneuvered through a crawl trench back to the edge of the minefield. There, he directed Major Virk to call in the medium guns for support while he contacted his Adjutant, Major Sukhinder Singh, to send the Reserve Company forward. In a tragic turn of events, Lieutenant Colonel Khanna was struck by a burst of Machine-Gun fire in the side of his stomach. It was miraculous that he had not been hit earlier.
Major Virk, despite being shot through the shoulder, continued to coordinate fire support. The arrival of Charlie Company, the Battalion reserve led by Captain Anup Singh, began to shift the momentum in favor of the Indian forces. Captain Jai Singh of Alpha Company took charge along with Captain Surjit Singh of Delta Company, and 2 SIKH continued to fight from the foothold created by Lieutenant Colonel Khanna.
Lieutenant Colonel Khanna, who had been leading the charge, succumbed to his injuries while being evacuated. Despite this loss, the Indian forces pushed on. At 0710 hours, the success signal was flashed from the top of Raja, indicating 2 SIKH’s victory. 2 SIKH had suffered significant casualties, including the loss of their Commanding Officer and two Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs)—Subedars Balwant Singh and Gurbax Singh—and thirty- seven other ranks killed. Three officers, three JCOs, and ninety-six other ranks were wounded. Major Balwant Singh, the Second-in-Command, arrived from Battalion HQ and assumed Command.
Shortly thereafter, two companies of 3 RAJ RIF, the Brigade Reserve, reached Raja. With Rani already captured by the Dogra’s, the Pakistanis could only respond with intense bombardment, resulting in two more casualties.
Conclusion
The leadership displayed by Lieutenant Colonel Khanna was of the highest order. The men who fought under him paid tribute in just four words — ‘Raja litta, Raja ditta!’ (We captured Raja but sacrificed our king!).
93 Infantry Brigade then consolidated by capturing Chand Tekri and fighting many smaller operations, as it cleared the way for Meghdoot Force to advance on Kahuta and close the southern pincer by linking up with 68 Infantry Brigade subsequently.
Lieutenant Colonel Khanna’s personal example of being at the head of the assaulting columns and not giving up inspite of being hit by bullets three times till he finally collapsed after the capture of the objective was in the highest traditions of the Indian Army and his legacy has inspired many future generations.
Dr. S Radhakrishanan, the President of India presenting the Maha Vir Chakra to Smt Savitri Khanna, wife of Lt Col NN Khanna.
Dhananjay Shinde, has been a researcher with multiple think tanks. Presently he is at USI, where he is engaged in intense defence related research and has contributed extensively in the form of articles to the project of recording India’s post-independent military history.
