Introduction
Tanks have been the centerpiece of most militaries for decades. Their presence has been paramount right since their first appearance on the battlefield of Somme in 1916. However, more recently their centrality is being questioned. Some of the most striking images of the Ukrainian conflict have been the large number of Russian tanks and that have been destroyed, abandoned, or broken down. The Ukrainian military is destroying tanks with a variety of weapons, including land mines, Stugna-P guided missiles, and shoulder-fired missiles like Javelins and NLAWs (next generation light armoured weapon). The toll seems to be horrific.
Are we now at the ‘tipping point’? Are tanks confronted with an existential threat from new tools of war which are nimbler, lighter, cheaper and more flexible that are easier to use.
Emerging Anti-Tank Weapon Systems
From the day the tank was introduced in 1916, its utility has been questioned. A platform that is heavy, difficult to design and produce, and needs highly skilled manpower to operate. It has had the unique ability of spurring advancements in anti-tank weaponry used to defeat it, be it missiles including the new top attack version, mines, attack helicopters and aircraft. In addition, technology has developed reliable and robust command and communications which has ushered in a new era of destruction from drones, sensors, and EW.
The Javelin is a portable anti-tank missile system that can be carried and launched by a single person. With a range of 2500 m, it traces its target’s thermal picture and is useful against tanks because it can strike from the top. Javelin is a fire-and-forget missile with lock-on before launch and automatic self-guidance. The system takes a top-attack flight profile against armoured vehicles, attacking the usually thinner top armour, but can also make a direct attack, for use against buildings, targets too close for top attack. It is equipped with an imaging infrared seeker. The tandem warhead is fitted with two shaped charges: a precursor warhead to detonate any explosive reactive armour and a primary warhead to penetrate base armour. The Javelin was first deployed in 1996.
The NLAW is a man-portable, soft-launch, and confined-spaces system, allowing the missile to be fired from almost anywhere. The missile is first shot out of the launcher with a low-powered ignition system, after which its main rocket ignites and propels it to the target. Guidance uses a predicted line of sight (PLOS) system. For a moving target, the operator maintains tracking for at least 2–3 seconds, the software embedded in the missile’s INS system makes a record of operator’s aiming movement, and computes the flight path which will intercept the target. After launch, the missile flies autonomously along the pre-programmed flight path, controlled by an inertial guidance system. Against tanks and other armoured vehicles, the overfly top attack (OTA) mode is used; the missile flies about one metre above the line of sight, detonating the warhead above the target’s weaker top armour via proximity fuse and magnetic sensors. It was inducted into service in 2009. The question is whether the effectiveness of these two weapon systems of US and UK origin, rendered the tank as, ‘useless’ and viewed as a “historic legacy.”
Are these weapons fundamentally changing the manner in which this war is being fought and ‘pushing the tank into obsolescence’? In fact, there are images of Russian tanks fitted with a semi cage-like canopy welded over the turret. This suggests an overall increase in its silhouette. Some analysts have labelled them ‘cope cages’ that cater to the psychological fear of tank crews to top attack threats as they felt the ERA panels needed to be augmented. However, data of their efficacy remains doubtful particularly against the newer generation of anti-tank weapons which use thermal or optical homing and trigger the shaped charges. The decision to fit these cages could be ascribed to combat experiences in Syria, and even Chechnya, where the anti-tank grenade launcher was aimed from windows of buildings onto tank turrets. There is however no doubt that the significant threat posed by handheld anti-tank weapons and loitering munitions means that any armoured vehicle entering the direct fire zone will need some form of active protection to survive.
Active Protection System
With so many weapon systems on the battlefield aiming for the tank, the need was felt for a new system that could protect the tank from all kinds of incoming projectiles. Hence the Active Protection System.
An active protection system is a system designed to prevent anti-armour line-of-sight weapons from acquiring and/or destroying a target.
Soft Kill Measures. Electronic countermeasures that alter the electromagnetic, acoustic, or other signature(s) of a target thereby altering the tracking and sensing behaviour of an incoming threat are designated soft kill measures. Pre-emptive action of countermeasures is directed to generally prevent lock-on of a threat sensor to a certain target. It is based on altering the signature of the target by either concealing the platform signature or enhancing the signature of the background, thus minimizing the contrast between the two. Soft kill countermeasures can be divided into on-board and expendable countermeasures. Whereas on-board measures are fixed on the platform to be protected, expendable measures are ejected from the platform.
Hard Kill Measures. Measures that physically counterattack an incoming threat thereby destroying/altering its payload/warhead in such a way that the intended effect on the target is severely impeded are designated hard kill measures. The hard kill measure in general physically affects the incoming warhead/missile by means of either blast and/or fragmentation action. The action may lead to:
(a) Disturbance of the stability of a kinetic energy penetrator which will decrease its penetration ability as the deflection angle increases.
(b) Premature initiation of a shaped charge, but most likely improper initiation, thereby impeding optimum jet development of the metallic lining, usually copper, in the shaped charge.
(c) Destruction of the airframe of an inbound missile or shell.
One example of the Active Protection System is the Russian Shtora (Russian: “curtain”) System. Shtora-1 is an electro-optical jammer that disrupts semiautomatic command to line of sight (SACLOS) antitank guided missiles, laser rangefinders and target designators. Shtora-1 is a soft-kill, or passive-countermeasure system. The Shtora system can also locate the area within 3.5–5 degrees where the laser originated from and automatically slew the main gun to it, so that the tank crew can return fire and so that the stronger frontal turret armour is facing it. The system is mounted on the Russian T-80 and T-90 series tanks and the Ukrainian T-84. Even the Indian T90 was to come with the Shtora System, but it was later dropped due to the additional cost factor.
The other example is the Israeli Trophy designed to protect armoured vehicles from ATGMs, RPGs, anti-tank rockets, and HEAT rounds. A small number of explosively formed projectiles destroy incoming threats before they hit the tank. Its principal purpose is to supplement the armour of light and heavy armoured fighting vehicles and is developed by Rafael Advanced Defence Systems Ltd.
There is also Arena an active protection system (APS) developed at Russia’s Kolomna-based Engineering Design Bureau for the purpose of protecting armoured fighting vehicles from destruction by light anti-tank weapons, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), and missiles with top attack warheads. It uses a Doppler radar to detect incoming warheads. Upon detection, a defensive rocket is fired that detonates near the inbound threat, destroying it before it hits the vehicle.
The Russians also have the Afganit a complex radio electronic system combining active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, a computer subsystem, and dischargers, firing special rounds, whose fragments destroy incoming projectiles. Pictures of T-14 Armata and T-15 BMP show both the peculiar tube-shaped sub-munition dischargers sitting at the base of the T-14’s turret and on the T-15’s sides and the radars looking like small plastic plates. This active protection system caters to repulse all kinds of anti-tank projectiles, including top attack munitions.
Surprisingly, there have been no reports of the Shotora, Arena or Afganit having been used by the Russians in Ukraine and neither have tanks like the Armata been deployed. The Russians, seemingly haven’t felt the need to deploy their top end inventory and instead there are reports of mothballed T-62s being taken to the front to supplement the tank numbers.
Drones
The Bayraktar TB2 and similar designs have let all hell loose on the battlefield. The Drone effect on the tank, has been similar to what the ATGM effect was, in the 70s and 80s. Everyone thought that the days of the tank were numbered, but the tank overcame and emerged the victor. Similar is the Drone vs Tank episode. The Drone shouldn’t be viewed in isolation.
The servicing, maintenance and operative costs of military drones is prohibitive. The infrastructure needed to carry out such operations is similar to the standards required for operating fighter aircrafts. Although the present trend is to develop anti-drone weapon systems, the answer lies in targeting the bases. In case the basic flight infrastructure is damaged, it would lead to reduction or complete cessation of drone operations.
The Relevance of the Tank
Ironically the tank versus anti-tank saga dates back to the appearance of tanks on the battlefield. The 106 mm Recoilless gun, ATGM’s, attack helicopters, the top attack cluster munitions, the anti-tank mines, drones, fire and forget top attack ATGM and electronic warfare systems have all been developed and used to deter and destroy the tank. However, with its inherent firepower, mobility and protection and its flexibility in employment for both offensive and defensive tasks over varied terrain, there is no platform that has been able to replace it and there seems to be no replacement on the horizon. It will continue to remain the pre-eminent platform to determine the outcome of a conflict.
Arguments regarding the ‘sunset’ of the tank range from, the changing characteristics of the battlefield, exorbitant costs of production and maintenance, vulnerabilities, increasing focus on a sub peer enemy, delivery of firepower by aerial means, lack of strategic mobility, complexities of terrain, and its ineffectiveness in mountains and urban built-up areas. Apart from this is the necessity of a high level of integrated training required by the crew manning this destructive predator.
Mechanised Forces due to their mobility, fire power and shock action pre-empt, dislocate, and destroy/disrupt enemy forces by manoeuvre and tempo of execution of operations. They have the ability paralyse the enemy physically and psychologically in an unparalleled manner impacting the will of the enemy.
While significant improvements have taken place in firepower; (most guns are now 120mm or 125mm, with advanced fire control systems); breakthroughs in armour protection traditionally focused on the classical frontal arc, appear to have plateaued after the RHA (Rolled Homogeneous Armour) was first replaced with composite armour or Chobham in the Challenger. An anticipated 360-degree threat has its limitations, as an increase in the weight of the tank, (Challenger 2 is 74.8 tons), has multiple effects apart from increased maintenance requirements. However, new technologies could change this paradigm. Further, upgrades of a tank during its lifespan often leads to an increase in weight often without the commensurate upgrading of the engine and running gear, resulting in a reduction of the power to weight ratio.
Irrespective of mindsets, the tank is the ‘king’ of the battlefield. It is that one solid piece of metal that can constantly create criticalities for the enemy in all phases of operations. In the modern complex battlefield, it is an armoured formation that is the most dreaded weapon in the enemy’s arsenal.
An Armoured formation is structured around the ‘king’, to provide the necessary military wherewithal to the ‘king’, to help it to achieve its aim. While the tank remains the primary weapon, the armoured formation is organised as a “combined all arms team” consisting of mechanised infantry, self- propelled artillery, air defence, combat engineers, attack helicopters, armed drones, surveillance & electronic warfare (EW) means and logistics. The entire behemoth is provided with matching mobility. This mix of weapons has to be a tailor-made package, based on the visualized threat and terrain, the components of which must complement each other.
The tank is a highly agile, potent weapon system. Fully enclosed in armour protection. 1000 plus HP engine. Over 40 rounds in the turret, capable of firing up to 08 rounds a minute from a highly sophisticated all weather, day/night fire control system. A track that can propel the tank over the most rugged of terrains.
To seize and hold ground in the plains you need a tank. The most challenging phase of warfare is the attack: seizing and holding contested territory. The penetration of enemy defences is difficult and dangerous. It invariably requires the shock effect and brute force that only armour supported by artillery can bring. It is for this reason that the tank has endured and will continue to remain a key component in any land conflict.
Conclusion
The real lesson we need to draw is that the combined arms concept along with joint operations synergy will lead to force optimization and is critical for success.
Tanks in the Indian context were last used against a peer enemy in 1971 Indo-Pak war and against a sub peer enemy during Op Pawan, in Sri Lanka in 1987. Currently, they operate in all types of terrain including; deserts, semi- developed, developed, and mountains. The subtleties of their employment differ. However, to guard against similar problems, a multi-dimensional protection of this platform against both aerial and ground threats is imperative.
While the tank is neither dead nor dying it needs to prevail in the future battle spaces for which it needs to adapt. This is not only as far as mitigating its threats is concerned but also with regards to its employment by ensuring increasing inclusivity with other platforms as a combined arms team.
Since this article is primarily about tanks, let me say in plain language that the primary weapon to destroy a tank, is a tank. Did we all not see the dramatic difference the tank made recently, post the Galwan episode, when the T90s suddenly appeared on the Kailash Range in Eastern Ladakh.
A professional Army cannot think of reducing its tank fleet, when the enemy is fast building up more and more. The PLA of China has 5400 main battle tanks and 750 light tanks. Pakistan has over 4000 tanks (although of various vintages and origin with varied modernisation). China has recently provided Pakistan with 176 latest VT4 tanks. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, there is no room for reduction of tanks.
There may be chinks in the armour, but there is no doubt that heavy metal still rocks the charts.
