India’s defence imports have a long and complex history. India’s initial defence imports were mainly from the UK, the US and France. This shifted towards the Soviet Union in the 1960s, with purchases of fighter jets and tanks. After the Soviet collapse, India began to diversify its imports, purchasing equipment from the US, Israel, and France. India also focussed on indigenous defence production, engaging in joint production with Russia and Israel.
Global trends
A SIPRI Report lists the top five arms exporters as the United States, France, Russia, China and Germany, which account for 75% of total exports. In recent years, the US share has increased from 34% to 42%, while that of Russia decreased from 21% to 11%. Exports by France rose to 11%, resulting in France becoming the second largest exporter.
The top five arms importers are India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Ukraine and Pakistan. They account for 35% of total imports. India leads at 9.8%. China’s imports are pegged at 2.9%, while those of Pakistan are at 4.3%. India’s high reliance on imports is shaped by its difficult security environment and weak domestic defence-industrial capacities.
A few aspects stand out. Firstly, the known plans for future weapon deliveries indicate that the US will remain unchallenged as the largest arms exporter. Secondly, France’s arms exports will continue to rise and consolidate its global position as a producer of hi-tech weapon platforms. Thirdly, Russia’s share of exports might well reduce even further, given its war commitments and the state of its economy. In this context, diversification in avenues for India’s defence imports is essential to drive balanced development in military capability.
India’s dilemma
On February 14, US President Donald Trump announced his decision to allow the sale of F-35 stealth fighters to India. At face value, the offer looks lucrative, with China already working on the production of a sixth-generation stealth fighter, J-36. With Pakistan planning to acquire J-35 fighters from China, the Indian Air Force’s strategic vulnerability in a two-front threat is worrisome. Dwindling numbers and delays in indigenous efforts prompted the IAF chief to vent his operational readiness concerns at Aero-India 2025.
However, the US offer raises some fundamental questions. Can India afford an aircraft that costs $100 million apiece when there are other competing operational requirements along its sensitive land borders and the maritime domain? Would it rile Russia with whom we had a long defence imports relationship? Any rush to buy F-35s could impact our ongoing acquisitions, like the S-400 missile defence system.
The question then is whether India should reduce its dependence on Russia. Ravinder Pal Singh, former SIPRI Arms Procurement Project Leader, argues that this might not be the right question to ask. Instead, the question should be how India should retain its strategic autonomy and, despite its serious technological limitations, maintain political flexibility in its military technology choices and import-related decisions.
Difficult choices
To maintain its strategic autonomy, India should not be overly dependent on any one supplier. Buying Su-57 from Russia carries the risk of uncertain Russian production capacities. Besides, there are other issues of delivery timelines and uncertainty concerning Russian supply chains, spare parts and maintenance support. The other question is how reliable Russian support would be in case of a conflict between India and China.
On the other hand, buying F-35s from the US entails the risk of straining a long-standing defence relationship with Russia, which will have political ramifications. The purchase of F-35s in a flyaway condition would have fewer risks, but Americans might not agree to partial manufacturing. Restrictive terms of sale and end-user agreements and a lack of interest in transferring technology in the past make the US a less preferable partner for India when it comes to defence procurement.
In this context, would buying a mix of F35s and Su-57s, while continuing to expedite the indigenous AMCA project, be an optimal decision? Or would it be prudent to continue to build upon the Rafale fleet and explore future co-production possibilities?
India will have to make the right choice.
