Amongst the most highly decorated and illustrious battalions of the Indian Army is 4 KUMAON. Major Somnath Sharma of the battalion was awarded the PVC in 1947 for his exceptional bravery. During this conflict, the unit also won three MVC’s, including one to their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant t Colonel (later Lieutenant General) MM Khanna, who led the battalion from the front and was a highly distinguished soldier and exemplary leader.
They also have the unique honour of having two Chiefs who served in the battalion namely General SM Shrinagesh and General KS Thimayya. Raised in 1788, its rich and enviable history traces its roots to being part of Salabat Khan’s Army in the Deccan; they were also the first troops to be inducted into Siachen.
During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, the battalion was located in North Kashmir and was involved in a series of actions where they overcame great odds of terrain, enemy and extreme weather conditions to successfully capture and push back the Pakistanis in the area beyond Tangdhar in a region known as Bugina Bulge. It was a significant achievement as the Pakistani regular and Special Forces troops were in reinforced positions at dominating heights including Point 9013, (named due to its altitude in feet). The hill was subsequently renamed as “Kumaon Hill”.
But this article is not about is the extraordinary courage and incredible bravery of the men of this battalion led by one of its finest Commanding Officers Lieutenant Colonel Nasim Arthur Salick, VrC, whose inspiration, motivation, courage and personal example were some of the contributing factors to the battalion’s spectacular success along with his outstanding team of officers, JCO’s and soldiers. He stood out as a true leader who lived by a set of values and beliefs he wanted his men to emulate. The article is about what happened after the war.
The strongest bonds are created by the unique sense of esprit de corps that prevails which overcomes all challenges. Consequently, if the blame does not rest at the officer’s level, where does it lie?
The first action by the battalion commenced on the night of 08 August 1965, when they countered an infiltration group of over 130 Pakistanis in the area around Trehgam and prevented the capture of Kralpura Bridge, even though of the sixteen men who defended the bridge, ten were killed and three were seriously wounded. Their next action was on 20 September, when they were tasked to capture Point 9013, after 3/8 Gorkha Rifles had successfully captured Sanjoi an adjoining feature.
They captured this dominating feature in a daring, unexpected frontal attack at daybreak achieving surprise, and stunning the enemy. Their last action took place in the first two weeks of October, when the battalion carried out an infiltration manoeuvre over extremely difficult terrain, capturing enemy posts with the aim of destroying Jura Bridge on the Kishenganga River and clearing the enemy from Bugina Bulge. The battalion lost two officers, three JCO’s and forty-five other ranks in the war.
What is traumatic is that after the war, the battalion, having suffered heavy casualties in its engagements, was forced to withdraw from the areas it had captured. These orders to withdraw were dutifully carried out despite our legitimate claims to the captured areas. Such withdrawal was also done in other places such as the Haji Pir Pass and the heights around Kargil in 1965.
Wars and soldiers
In his stellar account of this tale, ‘Roar of the Tiger’ Brigadier Jasbir Singh, SM, a second-generation officer whose father was commissioned into the battalion in 1936, tells a story that needs to be told and not forgotten as it can influence future decisions when he recalls the hurt in the hearts of the troops who were asked to vacate the areas they had captured after tremendous efforts during a war.
To quote a passage from his book, “the war veterans were visibly upset when they talked about the aftermath of the heavy fighting. They were unanimous in saying that it was not the intense fighting or casualties that had hurt them but what came later will continue to hurt till their dying day!
They did not mind either the extreme hardship they had suffered during the war or even the large number of casualties, both killed in action (KIA) and wounded. But what had really hurt and left them confused and disillusioned, was the bitter fact that territory they had re-captured with superhuman efforts and bitter casualties was vacated and handed back to Pakistan”.
Most people struggle to locate this area as it does not bear easy recall or have the strategic significance of Haji Pir Pass. The ‘ Drawah Region’ renamed as Neelum Valley after partition, is one of the most sensitive sub sectors in the vicinity of the Line of Control(LoC). From Kel in the North via Athmuqam and Dudniyal to Tithwal (our side), the valley is under the complete domination of the Indian fortified positions along the LoC. There is a cartographic bulge on the eastern side called the “Bugina Bulge” which is a swathe of territory hugging the slopes of the Shamshabari Range.
This is the sub-sector of the Pakistan side which is used for launch pads to infiltrate terrorists into the Kupwara sector of Kashmir. Strategically, it is also very important because the foothold that the Pakistan Army has in Bugina Bulge is tenuous; it can be rolled aside at will by the Indian Army if the latter wishes to alter the alignment of the LoC. The Neelum Valley Road running at the valley floor is already dominated by the Indian Army and this domination will be completely reinforced should Bugina Bulge fall into Indian hands.
The Bugina Bulge also has the ability to dominate the ‘Nastachun’ or ‘Sadhna’ Pass and cut off Tangdhar located in a valley beyond the Pass. A Wikipedia search of the area of Tangdhar, a remote region frequently cut off in the winter due to heavy snow sparsely inhabited mainly by Gujjars, mentions that “ the area is popular for its cease fire violations and infiltration from Pakistan”.
Such feelings and thoughts as expressed by the troops of 4 KUMAON, though not documented and openly talked about, are not new: troops being asked to stop an advance while on the threshold of victory in Muzzafarabad in 1948, handing over of Haji Pir and Kargil heights in 1965 and the inability to negotiate permanence of the Kashmir problem while returning the Prisoners of War in 1971 would also have evoked similar sentiments amongst the combatants.
More than duty
Soldiers willingly sacrifice their lives when told about the vital importance of their task; they have a sense of pride and belonging to their unit, and they feel hurt and betrayed when asked to withdraw from land captured after their comrades have sacrificed their blood to capture it.
There are many questions that may be asked, the first being whether the troops felt they were let down by their officers. The answer to this in the Services is clear; the officers and troops all endured the same hardships, suffered the same casualties, with the ratio of officer casualties at times being higher and lastly the underlying ethos of ‘Namak, Naam aur Nishan’ is exemplified in all personnel irrespective of rank.
Soldiers willingly sacrifice their lives when told about the vital importance of their task; they have a sense of pride and belonging to their unit, and they feel hurt and betrayed when asked to withdraw from land captured after their comrades have sacrificed their blood to capture it.
The strongest bonds are created by the unique sense of esprit de corps that prevails which overcomes all challenges. Consequently, if the blame does not rest at the officer’s level, where does it lie? Is it with the senior leadership in not putting across the sense of sacrifice in achieving stated objectives or does it rest at the bureaucratic or political level? The answers are not easy to find.
Armies the world over are drilled to implicitly obey orders; this has always been the bedrock of the Armed Forces. In the words of Tennyson; “Theirs not to make reply, Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do and die” are universally applicable to all armies. The poem was inspired by the charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade in the Battle of Balaclava and owed its inspiration to an article published in the ‘Times’ on 13 November 1854 which stated that “The British soldier will do his duty, even to certain death, and is not paralysed by the fact that he is a victim of some hideous blunder”.
Democracy and army
The role of an Army in a democracy is to fulfil the mandate assigned to it without question. The Indian Army remains apolitical and serves the constitution of the country. It is the instrument of power, but does not itself wield any power, and always puts national interests first. Views are put forth, but once a decision is taken, it is implemented in letter and spirit. This implies that it must fulfil its tasks within the assigned framework and controls of the government, without intervention into politics. The Army also has to prevent its misuse by the executive for political aims. The Indian Army has done this admirably.
Hindsight of course gives us greater wisdom, and reflecting on these issues prepares ourselves for similar situations in future. Unfortunately, military history rarely offers simple solutions that can be applied universally as the variables that occur differ in each situation.
What is traumatic is that after the war, the battalion, having suffered heavy casualties in its engagements, was forced to withdraw from the areas it had captured.
While negotiating peace at the end of war/conflict, it is necessary that amongst the many issues that need to be considered, the sensibilities of the soldiers being asked to vacate areas legitimately held must also be included. It is a difficult and delicate task but needs to be given its due consideration, not only to safeguard against future security concerns but also because it has an effect on the morale of troops.
There is no doubt that we all serve different agendas, but while serving these we need to recognise and appreciate the sacrifices of soldiers. It is therefore imperative that the ongoing talks with China, though they seem to be a ‘deadlocked dialogue’ continue to be driven by the Army and that gains made on Kailash Range, South of Pangong Tso are not frittered away without suitable concessions.
After all, their actions were guided and will be continued to be guided by putting the ‘safety, honour and welfare of the country, first always and every time’.
