INTRODUCTION
During 1998–1999, Pakistan Army had surreptitiously inducted its troops in disguise to the Indian side of the LoC to occupy commanding positions. It had ingressed into Kargil District with multiple aims—to internationalize the Kashmir issue, challenge the sanctity of the LoC, and most importantly, to renew and sharpen the Pakistan-organized events in the Kashmir region. This was made under assumption that they would be able to wrestle some concession from India on the issue of Kashmir. The Kargil war of 1999 was fought between Indian forces and Pakistani Army in the high-altitude mountains, with jagged, near vertical hill faces, which posed both tactical and logistical problems.
The Kargil War lasted for more than two months, and India conducted Operation Vijay in a most methodical and professional manner to attack and recapture the enemy-held heights. The operation was a unique display of bravery, resolve, and commitment under inhospitable conditions of terrain and weather.
The role of Indian Air Force in this critical operation on the high altitude mountains was rightly perceived by both the political and military policy makers, however with its share of constraints and challenges. Air Vice Marshal (Dr) Arjun Subramaniam (Retd) writes, the IAF fought in an ‘unconventional’ manner in terms of the political constraints imposed on it in the form of stringent Rules of Engagement and terrain imperatives that had never been encountered before, and their associated impact on targeting. High altitude operations always come with challenges like severe degradation of aircraft and weapon performance.
Totally unfamiliar surroundings in the Kargil area made target recognition difficult from the ground, let alone from a fast moving aircraft. As a result, the initial few sorties from high levels were not effective as desired. However, once revised and modified profiles, tactics and manner of system usage had been perfected, the accuracy of the airstrikes improved dramatically.
The Western Air Command was given the responsibility to conduct operations during the Kargil War. The task assigned to the Indian Air Force was not to use air power, as an extended artillery but only in assistance to the Indian Army. The primary task of the use of air power was to degrade the offensive capabilities of the intruders by targeting their gun positions, bunkers, defences on mountain tops, destroy their supply lines, supply camps, and distribution centres.
PRELUDE TO AIR OPERATION
Indian Army had on 08 May 1999 projected the requirement of Attack Helicopters for use against the intruders, and also Helicopters for transport of troops. This came for consideration to the Indian Government between 12 May 1999 and 17 May 1999 and it was decided not to use this option as it may lead to escalation. On 25 May, 1999 after an in-depth appreciation of the emerging situation the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) took the decision to deploy the Indian Air Force. Finally on 25 May 1999 the CCS gave the go ahead for use of air power. Once the CCS approved the deployment of the Indian Air Force, the operations commenced on 26 May 1999. The approval came with a limitation that the IAF would not cross the Line of Control (LoC).
Air Vice Marshal (Dr) Arjun Subramaniam (Retd) writes, although, the IAF was not deployed during the initial phase of Operation Vijay, it had not only alerted its fighter Squadrons, but some aircraft were moved to the Valley for the impending operations.IAF also commenced a large-scale airlift of troops, ammunition and stores into the Sector. It also commenced aerial reconnaissance-and-strike familiarisation. The rapid mobilisation ensured that the IAF was ready for undertaking wide-ranging full-scale military operations by the morning of 15 May.
It was the air strikes conducted by the Indian Air Force on some of the key locations, that dramatically altered the equation in favour of India. The most prominent among them is the strike on the Muntho Dhalo.
The IAF began conducting initial reconnaissance sorties over the Kargil heights as early as 10 May 1999, less than a week after
the presence of the enemy incursion was first confirmed. On 12 May, an IAF Helicopter was fired upon near the most forward-based Pakistani positions overlooking Kargil and landed uneventfully with a damaged rotor. In the next few days, IAF Jaguar fighters conducted Tactical Reconnaissance sorties in the Kargil area to gather target information using their onboard long-range oblique photography systems.
On 21 May 1999, the presence of the personnel from the Pakistani 4th and 6th Battalions of the Northern Light Infantry’s and their positions was determined by an IAF Canberra Bomber of the 106th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron. The aircraft was tasked with flying over the Kargil Sector and identifying the enemy, who were likely to have been hiding inside igloo like entrenchments. The Photo Reece Canberra was effectively used in the Kargil conflict and brought the first photographic proof of enemy intrusion in our territory. Despite taking a missile hit, the aircraft managed to land back safely at a nearby base.
On the morning of 26 May 1999, IAF commenced air operations by attacking enemy positions & supply lines. The first strike was launched at 0630 hours by MiG-21, MiG-27ML & MiG-23BN fighters. MiG-29 on Combat Air Patrol provided Air Defence cover to strike aircraft. Post-strike, Canberra carried out recce to assess the damage inflicted on the enemy.
In the initial few days, the IAF suffered a few losses. Between 27 and 28 May, the IAF lost two aircraft—a MiG-21, a MiG-27 and a helicopter — Mi-17. On 27 May, the MiG-27, flown by Flight Lieutenant Kambampati Nachiketa developed mechanical problems forcing the pilot to eject. The MiG-21, flown by Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja orbiting in the area to look for Flight Lieutenant Kambampati Nachiketa was shot down by a shoulder fired heat seeking missile. Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja was awarded Vir Chakra Posthumously for displaying exceptional courage in going beyond the call of duty while searching for a downed brother officer.
On 28 May 1999 Nubra formation, 4 x Mi-17 were tasked to strike ‘Point 5140’ feature, located two kms North of Tololing’. Nubra formation took off in time and all went on perfectly well. However, Flight Lieutenant Subramaniam Muhilan was flying the Nubra-3 formation which got hit by the Stinger Missile. Despite Flight Lieutenant Muhilan’s best effort to control the damaged helicopter, it crashed killing him and all his crew members. He was awarded Vayu Sena Medal Posthumously. Wing Commander (later Air Commodore) Anil Kumar Sinha was the leader of the four aircraft formation. The rocket attack launched by the formation, despite the loss of the helicopter, was successful and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Wing Commander Anil Kumar Sinha was awarded with the Vir Chakra.
It was the air strikes conducted by the Indian Air Force on some of the key locations, that dramatically altered the equation in favour of India. The most prominent among them is the strike on the Muntho Dhalo. The Pakistani had built a supply camp in a bowl-shaped valley at Muntho. Over the days it grew up into a major supply depot. The strike of 16 June and 17 June by MiG27s and Mirage-2000s were devastating and later attacks in the area ensured destruction of fresh Pakistani attempts to reuse the base.
Each airstrike at the end was result of a carefully planned chain of events spanning several areas of specialisation. An airstrike had following components: –
(a) Recce mission(s).
(b) Airstrike mission(s).
(c) Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) mission(s).
(d) If so dictated by results of BDA, or by follow-up recce, repeated airstrikes.
As a result of these attacks, severe damage to enemy personnel and equipment became apparent in various areas. Any time the target was spotted, a very high success rate invariably resulted.
On 24 June the IAF used LGBs to decimate the enemy on Tiger Hill. The IAF continued to mount search and destroy missions when on 05 July a large Nissan hut in the Tiger Hill area was destroyed. Two days later, on 07 July, the IAF struck a logistics camp in the same area. Earlier, despite bad weather restricting flying, on 03 June, three enemy camps were destroyed. With Indian troops in very close proximity to the enemy, air attacks had to be carefully executed or on occasions even called off till a confirmation was received from the army that Indian troops were out of harm’s way. On 08 June, the IAF engaged targets in the Mushkoh Valley where the Pakistan Army had many storage dumps and bunkers.
The Indian Air Force strike operations ended on 12 July 1999. Overall during the air campaign, the IAF flew 550 strike missions, 150 reconnaissance missions, and over 500 escort flights. The IAF also flew 2185 helicopter sorties, logging 925 flying hours, for casualty evacuation and air transport operations.
CONCLUSION
This was the first-time combat air power has been used in the high mountain ranges above 15,000ft altitude. The Indian Air Force was equipped with supersonic fighter aircraft. India had not used the combat components of its air force either in the 1962 War with China or in the Siachen conflict with Pakistan.
The decision to deploy Air Force and the sheer professionalism of the Indian Air Force rapidly adapted itself to the challenge of offensive air operations in the. high Himalayan terrain while ensuring that Indian own troops did not become victims of “friendly fire” as has happened so often in other air forces. At the operational level, IAF’s air operations during the Kargil conflict clearly stand out amongst many other significant achievements. It showcased IAF ability to adapt, prioritise and deliver in a hitherto new operational environment. The images of the pinpoint LGB attacks on Tiger Hill by Mirage aircraft as well as the destruction of main logistic node at Muntho Dhalo will forever remind us of IAF’s professionalism and resolve.
Legendary Air Commodore Jasjit Singh in his book, Kargil 1999: Pakistan’s Fourth War for Kashmir concludes, “if India can beat a professional military force equipped with modern firepower, on the ground and at a time of Pakistan’s choice, with the initiative also in its hands, with strategic and tactical surprise almost complete, then India can beat Pakistan anytime, anywhere.”
