Israel’s assassination of the Hezbollah Chief Hasan Nazarallah on 27 September and its earlier targeting of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July, Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk in Russia, and China’s land, air and maritime intrusions commencing with Galwan in Eastern Ladakh and in the South China Sea have led to fears that long-simmering conflicts could escalate into broader wars.
The worry is that incidents of this sort could ratchet up tensions until policymakers lose control and enter into wars they do not intend to fight. To quote US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s remarks in August, attacks in the Middle East “raise the risk of dangerous outcomes that no one can predict and no one can fully control.”
Though provocative incidents can push crises up the escalation ladder but history provides few examples of conflicts that have erupted without policymakers’ authorisation and leaders frequently exercise restraint to avoid combat. A case in point being the 1962 Cuban missile crisis the world was closest to the brink of war was the closest during the Cold War.
When faced with the risk of a spiraling conflict, nations often find ways to de-escalate crises. But brinkmanship requires careful choreography and countries need to pressure their adversaries just enough to shape their behavior without crossing thresholds that could trigger a significant response. While India chose to de-escalate during Operation Parakram, unfortunately Pakistan’s behaviour didn’t change and we were forced to signal our intention many years later by resorting to surgical strikes.
Even crossing redlines does not make conflict inevitable. In April, the drone and missile attack that Iran launched against Israel did not ignite a full-scale conflict. But to avoid war, leaders on both sides must restrain themselves at moments of crisis without losing face or showing weakness. The essence lies in understanding how to navigate the interplay of pressure and restraint which then permits leaders to step back from the edge of war.
The fear of inadvertent escalation is not new. During the Cold War, policymakers worried that weapon malfunctions, false alarms from early warning systems, and unauthorized actions could spark a nuclear war. There are also views that countries go into conflicts when military actions create momentum that makes it impossible for political leaders to back away. Still others have argued that leaders might respond with major military strikes if they mistakenly perceive a rival’s limited actions as an existential threat.
Although analysts describe different pathways to inadvertent war, the assumption is that policymakers have limited control over escalation. Accordingly, states end up in wars they did not choose to fight because of chance or chain reactions. But even during the tensest moments of the Cold War, the US and USSR never accidentally fell into conflict. Instead they always found a way out.
What makes crises unpredictable is that the redlines are often not publicly known. They can be geographic, can be based on the type of target or on the intensity of an adversary’s actions. But ambiguity enhances deterrence by forcing opponents to exercise restraint, lest they cross a perceived escalation threshold.
Countries also control escalation by limiting the physical effects of their coercive actions. Avoiding casualties or major infrastructure damage makes it easier for targeted states to refrain from serious retaliation. For example, Israel responded to Iran’s April attack by striking a single radar at a critical Iranian air defense site. It demonstrated Israel’s ability to target advanced systems deep within Iran. Since the strike caused limited harm, Iran could downplay the attack and avoid launching a significant retaliation.
The fact is that escalation does not guarantee victory, and the costs of fighting might outweigh the gains. As a result, nations are often better off coming to a settlement that advances their strategic objectives without going to battle.
As crises become more intense, the role leaders play in pulling countries away from the precipice of war becomes increasingly important. Unfortunately, believing we need peace does not make it happen.Decision makers must identify ways to pursue their aims and deter future harm while avoiding war.
