On 09 December 2022, two and a half years after the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army’s (PLA) May-June 2020 aggression and misadventure in Ladakh, over 300 of its troops reportedly attempted to seize an Indian Army’s post in Arunachal Pradesh at Yangtse.
Yangtse, is located about 25 kms as the crow flies from Tawang and along with the Bum La axis forms one of the two approaches to access Tawang. It is a flat ground surrounded by hills on its Northern, Western, and Eastern side. The Northern hills are in China occupied territory while on the South-West side lies Mago which is the entrance of the Yangtse plateau. Yangtse is located at an altitude of 15000-15500 feet while the surrounding heights vary from 16000 to 17000 feet.
Its North-Eastern approach terminates in China and since Yangtse is located at a height, it offers a clear view of Chinese posts across the LAC as well as their maintenance routes.
Towards the North, in the foothills of the Yangtse plateau, there are Chinese posts located in Cona County and a few kms away from the LAC opposite Yangtse, they have their important military base in Xiaokang, a logistics base en route to Bhutan, Sikkim, and Dokalam area serving their needs hence China has to dominate it at any cost.
Every year PLA sends its troops to this area to try to validate its claim, however, this time they not only failed miserably but got a thorough thrashing by the Indian Army .
PLA’s dirty tricks
While patrolling is done by a up to a Platoon strength, 300 troops, which are of almost two to three Companies strength, attempting to seize an Indian Post at night raises concerns as it cannot be considered as a routine transgression attempt and was far more serious than being portrayed by the Government and the Army. Besides, patrolling on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is normally done during daytime as a confidence building measure (CBM) because any surreptitious movement at night raises questions.
In any case, PLA made a mockery of CBMs and has broken every single Agreement on “Peace and Tranquillity” by its transgressions in some locations in Eastern Ladakh in May and all the more so at Galwan in June 2020 and all this ironically bulletlessly, with medial barbaric weapons.
Of course, they paid heavily for killing twenty Indian Army personnel of 14 BIHAR including their Commanding Officer. In the revenge attack by Indian Army personnel, again ironically, bulletless, more than double the number of PLA troops were killed. The mockery of bulletless offensive action by PLA has continued for long till the latest 09 December 2022 attempt to unilaterally trying to change the status quo/further change the LAC.
While Yangtse’s background as a bugbear to the Chinese has been briefly mentioned, Tawang’s is quite interesting and an even greater irritant to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and PLA ever since 1951, when it came under India.
Looking back
Sometime in early January 1951, then Governor of Assam, Shri Jairamdas Daulatram summoned Major Relengnao (Bob) Khating, Assistant Political Officer (APO), Sela and instructed him to occupy Tawang and extend the Indian administration up to that place. Khating, who served in the Assam Regiment and also in Assam Rifles, was one of the few officers selected for the short- lived Indian Frontier Administrative Service, hence his posting as the APO. He was to establish an advance administrative headquarters at Tawang and stay put there.
Soon afterwards, on 17 January 1951, Khathing began his arduous journey from Charduar, Assam with Captain Hem Bahadur Limbu and a team of soldiers from 5 Assam Rifles, which was a pioneering expedition negotiating extremely inhospitable terrain in sub-zero temperatures. They reached Tawang on 06 February 1951.
Khating then met and interacted with a number of ‘gaon budhas’ (village headmen) and quickly and effectively established authority over Tawang and the Indian tricolour was hoisted on 09 February 1951. Indian administrative presence was thus established in this remote part of the country.
The move never forgotten
Prime Minister Nehru, who came to know about this development later- because he was not kept informed about it-was furious. It transpired that the orders were given by then Home Minister Sardar Patel to Governor Daulatram to undertake the operation of occupying Tawang without taking Nehru into confidence, as Sardar Patel did not want a repeat of the 1948 Kashmir fiasco.
The Chinese never forgot India’s move to annexe Tawang, nor did they forget 5 Assam Rifles, which also escorted His Holiness the Dalai Lama, then very young, in 1959 into India after his escape from Lhasa.
After the September – October 1967 skirmishes between Indian Army and PLA at Nathu La and Cho La, in Sikkim, in which PLA lost almost 400 troops, CCP and PLA pressed very hard for no use of firearms against each other and resolving all disputes/issues by dialogue only. They then made a mockery of this restriction of their choice by killing four Riflemen of 5 Assam Rifles in October 1975 at Tulung La, Arunachal Pradesh, not with bullets but by torture.
India’s narrative against China must be reviewed and re-framed and appropriate use of India’s military capability must get accepted by the political leadership.
Nehru’s politics and miserable handling of China and India’s civil-military relations have cost the Indian Army dearly by way of the blood of its troops and the nation’s security/integrity by way of much territory lost to China – bulletlessly since 1967.
While Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi was most assertive in her dealings with China (sanctioning use of artillery against PLA in Sikkim in 1967) and Pakistan (heeding to the advice of then Army Chief and regarding the war, which cut off East Pakistan in 1971) , unfortunately his grandson’s wife, Sonia Gandhi and her son, Rahul Gandhi have reportedly been involved in secret deals with the Chinese during the UPA’s tenure, which are believed to be quite detrimental to India’s security.
Not only that, Rahul Gandhi has publicly been berating his own country’s Army and speaking in favour of the Chinese/PLA after the Yangtse incident-outrightly lying by stating that Indian Army soldiers got bashed by their Chinese counterparts despite videos going around showing Indian Army soldiers bashing and chasing PLA’s ‘Agniveers’.
As seen in 1967, CCP/PLA are very allergic to conventional warfare with firearms and quite shy of body-bags. They ensure total hold on information and work hard at using disinformation. They declare ridiculously low figures of fatal casualties in military operations and after Covid emanating from Wuhan Institute of Virology, they have suppressed very much about what all has transpired.
Indian equation
While Indian Army has been quite reticent in disclosing/dissemination of whatever happened during 2020 and onwards as compared to fair amount of openness on operational occurrences in earlier years/decades, the Government repeatedly stating since 2020 that no territory has been occupied by China, amounts to giving China a clean chit. Hence the Chinese efforts in bulletlessly trying to grab/occupy territory/change the alignment of the LAC are going to continue. It remains to be seen for how long fisticuffs, nail-embedded sticks and stones will work in managing the LAC.
India’s narrative against China must be reviewed and re-framed and appropriate use of India’s military capability must get accepted by the political leadership. Also, the armed forces must be provided/replenished with all arms and equipment to achieve an edge over China. Remember, PLA excels in projection of its military arsenal and great parades.
It does not have a stomach for battle on the ground and is working hard at waging war against India in many other ways/means. After 55 years of not firing at each other and PLA relentlessly attempting its land-grabbing attempts and often succeeding only means that they are taking Indian forces for granted. It is high time that India reviews the LAC as perception-based and the bulletless policy by giving PLA a shock of bullets and bombs.
This writer, who was a Defence Ministry and Army spokesperson for ten years , cannot help but strongly recommend some measure of transparency. Because opaqueness particularly in dealing with CCP-PLA combinations constant lies, deceit, propaganda with such a spread of social media is counter-productive. Much of what is referred to in this comment has been elaborated in this writer’s latest book, China Bloodies Bulletless Borders (2022, Pentagon Press LLP).
And last but certainly not the least, in view of China’s future plans and with Pakistan parroting the nuclear threat and acquiring so called tactical nuclear weapons, India needs to re -calibrate its nuclear use policy.
