About The Author
Sam Cowan served with Gurkha soldiers for many years in Nepal but also in Malaya, Singapore and Borneo, eventually becoming Colonel of the Brigade of Gurkhas and the Chairman of the Gurkha Welfare Trust. In this capacity he had official audiences with both King Birendra and King Gyanendra.
After retirement, he started researching and writing articles on Nepali history. Apart from that he has trekked extensively in Nepal. This book; ‘Maharajas, Emperors, Viceroys, Borders: Nepal’s relations North and South’written from a personal viewpoint is acollection of his important articles. As he states ‘retirement from the Army meant that he could express his views publicly’.
About the Book
The book comprises of eight articles which cover the period from the Anglo- Nepal wars till 2008. the first of which discusses the Kalapani Lipu Lekh border a disputed territory between Northwest Nepal and India, which after festering for several years, came to the forefront in 2020. Cowan provides much needed context and a detailed investigation into major aspects of the border that is now in the forefront of Indo- Nepal relations, including a history of the frontier, created in the aftermath of 1814-1816 Anglo-Nepal war and subsequent Sugauli Treaty.
Drawing on reproductions of files and maps from archives and relevant academic studies, Cowan details the roles and limitations of the demarcation. While India felt that in order to provide security from China, India’s sovereignty would only be guaranteed if the Himalaya’s were secured, not just the Indian Himalaya but Bhutanese and Nepali too. Prime Minister Nehru has been quoted during his visit to Nepal in June 1959 as saying;” the Himalayas are the guardians and sentinels of India and Nepal and their white capped peaks welcome friends and are a warning to those of hostile intent”. To do so required a strong military presence near or on other countries’ borders. Yet while Nepal worried that it ran the risk of becoming a mere province of India, it also required assistance guarding its long remote frontier. The Indian military extended an offer to Nepal to help open and run border checkpoints between Tibet and Nepal and from 1952 to 1970, there were 18 Indian military checkpoints on Nepal’s Northern frontier.’ As per Cowan, ‘LipuLehk’s absence from the list is striking and revealing’
As regardsLipu Lekh, Cowan claims that there was a longestablished diplomatic precedent for China and India treating Lipu Lekh as Indian territory and as a recognized border post between India and China. To quote Cowan; ‘India from the date of its independence has assumed and acted on the basis that the trail to Lipu Lekh fell exclusively within its territory and the ownership of the Pass was exclusively between it and China”.
China accepted this principle as per Article IV of the Sino – Indian Trade Agreement over the Tibet Border in 1954 and this status remained unchanged in both the MoU on Border Trade during President Li Peng’s visit to Delhi in 1991 and the ‘Protocol of Entry and Exit Procedure’ for border trade in July 1992. In both these Agreements Lipu Lekh was mentioned as a ‘mutually agreed border trading point’.
This was again reenforced in Article V of the Agreement between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on 11 April 2005. Whereas Nepal had made no attempt to create similar diplomatic convention or support, as he writes “Nepal’s case for Kalapani has been badly undermined by long years of silence on the issue by the country’s leaders.” Details of the case are too vast to go into here, but Cowan provides a balanced understanding of the border dispute and the geopolitical realities.
The truth is that the Sugauli Treaty signed on 04 March 1816 never had a map attached as “all maps were so incorrect that no satisfactory judgement could be framed from them”. To put it simply the British wanted a trade route to Tibet ‘free of interference by the Gorkhas’ and hence Edward Gardner the Commissioner of Kumaon was given the ‘authority to move the boundary as far East’ from the river and ‘adjust the treaty terms accordingly’. In fact, the book quotes historical records to state that ‘Nepal’s recent claim to Limpiyadhura, based on what is written in the Sugauli Treaty and framed using almost identical words used by Bum Shah was firmly rejected by Lord Moira in September 1817’. In addition, the ‘China- Nepal Boundary Treaty signed by King Mahendra in Beijing in October 1961‘makes no mention at all to Lipu Lekh’. As per Cowan ‘it corresponds to the 1879 map and the one claimed by India today’. Quoting Ambassador Rakesh Sood; ‘we now have aterritorial dispute between India and Nepal and it’s not going to be easy’. ‘I think this will be remembered as PM Oli’s lasting legacy to have created an insurmountable problem in India – Nepal relations.’
Chapter three covers the three meetings at Lipu Lekh between the Surveyor Captain Web b who was responsible for carrying out the survey of Kumaon and Chinese Governor of Taklakot in May 1816 at Lipu Lekh. Cowan also writes about the Survey of India map of ‘Kumaon and British Gurhwal’ published in 1850’ ‘which accurately showed the line of the border as decreed in the Sugauli Treaty ‘and quotes the Governor Generals letter of 05 September 1817 ‘rejecting in the strongest terms Nepal’s claim to the land it is now claiming again.’ He states ‘that there is no record of any official in Kathmandu protesting against the ruling, and the matter rested there till 13 June 2020’.
The book isn’t just focused on border disputes. There’s coverage of the NepalTibet war of 1792, which was an awakening for the Gorkhas, who suffered a rare military defeat and were forced to sign a Peace Treaty ‘and entered into a feudatory relationship with China’
Cowan also provides a detailed analysis of the East India Company and its relationship with the Qing Dynasty, and how this relationship directly impacted the British relationship with Nepal. He states,that ‘the English had become hooked on tea’ which became a major source of profit for the East India Company and China was the only producer, hence there was ‘acute sensitivity to Chinese feelings. ’Hence before launching the war Lord Moira obtained ‘informed views on likely Chinese reactions.’
The book also throws light on how the Nepalese tried to draw the Chinese into the war.The Nepalese ‘wanted China to support its military rivalries’ the pleadings of which intensified’ in 1814. Cowan says ‘Nepal’s intricate manoeuvres ended total failure.’ He goes on to write that ‘they also found out the hard way just how limited and restricted were China it owed its vassals.’ views on obligations He also gives insights into what the British wanted in the aftermath of the Gorkha war, what the Quing dynasty thought about this and the Western borders of Nepal.
There’s an in-depth essay on King Mahendra and his role in key events of Nepali history, including the drafting of the 1959 constitution by Sir Ivor Jennings ‘who wrote the Ceylon Constitution in 1946 had a completely different mindset to the man who was called to help draft Nepal’s new constitution’. Amid Cold War imperatives placed political stability over the democratic rights of Nepal’s citizens thereby favouring the ‘hereditary executive’’ ‘giving him total and absolute control over the Army’ leading the way for King Mahendra’s subsequent coup in 1960.
In fact, the book clearly brings out how he prevented the advent of democracy by arresting BP Koirala the first Prime Minister. Cowan does an admirable job in portraying both the fallout and resistance to the coup, but the inner worries and doubts of King Mahendra and criticism by the West, fortunately for King Mahendra the 1962 Indo China war ‘came to his rescue,’ thus saving ‘his imposed Panchayat system and his absolute position within it.’
In addition, ‘after the November 1962 war, Indian opposition to Mahendra weakened rapidly and he was able to embark on his much-acclaimed strategy of playing China off against India, which essentially consisted of worrying India that he was getting closer to China’.
The various facets of the relationship between the Ranas, who ruled Nepal autocratically for 104 years, and the British, who gave them legitimacy, is given out beautifully. The book also covers the importance that the many military awards and insignia played in internal Rana politics. As the Ranas greatly desired these awards,this keenness to get not just an award but the most senior and prestigious one possible gave the British officials more opportunities to try to use the awards to get Nepal’s rulers to adopt policies that were advantageous to British interests.
While the essays cover how the Nepalese allowed recruiting of Gurkhas for the British Indian Army to take place it also throws light on an interesting facet of the character of the Ranas as General Sir Kaiser Shamsher Jung on being appointed as Kinght of Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (KBE) wanted Garrads of London to make himan extra-large star as he thought the regulation pattern star was not impressive enough.
Conclusion
The book backed by maps and historical documents gives an insight into key aspects of Nepali history throwing light on some lesser-known aspects by the authors access to archival material. Each chapter takes a particular historical episode and with Cowan’s ‘obsessive commitment’ to dig deep reveals certain facts that throw light on the events from an unusual angle.
Meticulously researched, analysed and written with intellectual rigour, the book is an insightful collection on key events which include the Anglo- Nepal War of 1814-16 and the Treaty of Sugauli in 1823 and their relevance to contemporary issues including the dispute regarding Lipu Lekh and the area to its West known as Limpiyadhura.It is a book that is both scholarly and readable and needs to be read by those who are interested in Nepal’s unique political history and its impact on India.
