Introduction
The vast array of weapons and equipment in the inventory of any force represents a major component of military capability which has to be kept mission capable 24×7, 360 degrees. This vital point is generally missed out by the planners in the never-ending quest for new systems. However, in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine the importance of sustainable equipment capability has been aptly driven home. The war has seen massive attrition of men and steel mostly using aerial platforms and precision artillery. The issue of capability readiness of in- service systems, ensured by timely in -service engineering activities like medium/ base reset and technology refresh initiatives has repeatedly surfaced during the war. Warring sides are finding it difficult to sustain readiness rates beyond 50%.
Artillery Modernisation Plans
The Artillery Profile 2027 (Acquisition Plan) was drafted in year 2008 with an outlay of over 20,000 crores. A Field Artillery Rationalisation Plan(FARP) was proposed that comprised direct import, manufacture under license and indigenous development of weapon systems. FARP aimed to replace the weapons of Artillery Regiments with modern artillery guns, predominantly 155mm medium guns; procuring 3,000 to 3,600 pieces of artillery to include 1,580 Towed, 814 Mounted, 180 Self-Propelled Wheeled, 100 Self-Propelled Tracked and 145 Ultra-Light 155mm/52 calibre artillery guns. However, budgetary constraints have impacted both acquisition of new systems and in-service support of legacy systems. As on date a fair segment of tube artillery remains legacy and even new systems inducted are inching towards obsolescence. Sustainment costs generally get into a tailspin if imported systems like Bofors, ULH, K9 are to be sustained alongside indigenous ones. The resources required to service and support a weapon system are expensive and quickly outpace initial cost of the weapon. With increased deployments in difficult terrains like LAC,in- service engineering costs are bound to increase and hence at some point of time the Death Spiral could kick in, where sustainment costs equal the net value of the budget, leaving less slack for new acquisitions. Hence it is important that innovative solutions are crafted to support legacy systems that are economical, cost effective and address the twin issues of obsolescence and modernisation. This could extend the service life of these platform covering capability risks due to delayed acquisitions.
Capability Readiness
Military Capability denotes an integrated and agile combination of trained personnel, mission capable equipment, infrastructure, information systems, organizational structures & process that can create a military effect in a range of operational contingencies. The ability to achieve a desired effect is defined by capability readiness, sustainable capability & force structure.
It also represents combat systems that are held in the inventory and the sophistication of technology in these. Capability readiness is concerned with the extrinsic aspects of the platform as to how it will perform or what measured equipment capability (EC) it will deliver when deployed in a wider system of systems. EC is defined as the enduring ability of the weapon system to generate a desired operational outcome or effect & is relative to the threat, physical environment & in situ engineering abilities of the maintainer.
Except for mechanical systems, most systems show increased failures with age, usage and deployment (AUD), e.g. while the M777 Light Howitzer may be having an ability to deliver ten to twelve second lines without a mission abort failure today, ten years later this capability could get severely degraded due to AUD effects. Add to this, the quality of user level maintenance, input materials used, technical maintenance carried out in shelters with accompanying dust & humidity, quality of ammunition and spare parts used, the extent of degradation could spike much above standard OEM estimates. It is thus through a well-established engineering (maintenance and refit) infrastructure that resuscitation of these systems can be carried out to restore their battle endurance and sortie reliability to Like New i.e. enabling a gun to fire nearly the same numbers of roundsa s it did while entering service. Facilitation for such in- service engineering support is generally lacking and is imperative.
It is seen that in the absence of a clear understanding of the meaning and intent of the term operational availability, it has come to be loosely linked to garage availability—the total no of guns available in garages/ storage. Operational or pulse availability on the other hand is the number of guns available during a combat pulse that can guarantee an uptime equal to or that exceeding the duration of the combat pulse. This can happen only if at the acquisition stage, special attention is paid to system reliability and maintainability.
Reliability determines the battle endurance of a weapon system and hence the ability of a fire unit to accomplish missions. Maintainability impacts the time needed to complete repairs and return the system back into action. One needs to maintain a system to make it reliable and once you have a reliable system then only it is available for operational employment. When in use during high tempo operations it has to be sustained over the combat pulse, and this is what is capability readiness. Sustainability is a function of maintainability, reliability and availability and needs to be considered as a Key Performance Parameter (KPP) in new GSQRs.
Through Life Capability Readiness (TLCR)
This is an approach to acquisition and in-service capability management of any weapon system throughout its entire life cycle from cradle to grave. It is time this best practice is adopted to address the degradation in equipment capability due to AUD effects and plug operational capability gaps through technology refresh.
One cannot have the extravagance of replacing complex systems like guns, missiles and rocket systems every other decade taking into account spiralling costs of acquisition and engineering support. Hence legacy equipment will remain a component of any Army`s inventory.
In the absence of synergy between the acquisition and in-service engineering processes, the period of inactivity famously referred to as the Do Nothing Syndrome ,leads to existing capability degrading and new acquisitions getting delayed, giving way to serious operational capability gaps. It also entails huge hidden costs that could end up in the Death Spiral. By taking a through life view of capability, the Army can address interim capability gaps and seek a fine balance between new acquisitions and legacy systems. Any half-baked initiative and neglect of technical maintenance can be catastrophic, as is evident from the decreasing readiness levels of platforms on either side in the Ukraine war.
The delay in the induction of next generation artillery guns and modern ammunition requires that in the interim, a holistic examination of refurbishment programme of artillery systems is undertaken so that risks are covered by modernisation of legacy systems. This requires integrated MRO capabilities both at Theatre level and Basereset.
Ironically, the Army has ended up dismantling Theatre level engineering resources in the single-minded pursuit of cutting the tail, one such unit was responsible for sustaining most artillery systems during the Kargil War. In “Soviet Field Artillery in World War II” by Michael Foedrowitz, it is stated that one of the most successful Soviet guns (serial No 2464) was a 1938 model 122mm field gun which fired a total of 6541 shells covering a distance of 4605 kms from Moscow to the Baltic coast. A fine example of system maturity demonstrating how simple and well-maintained systems can perform reliably. Its successor the D-30 of 1960 design is still being used in the war in Ukraine, 60 years after development.
Equipment down time can be drastically reduced if a strong focus is placed on preserving system reliability through proper warehousing, reliability centred maintenance and readiness-based sparing. Spare part provisioning is an engineering and readiness related function and cannot be provisioned in the same manner as boots and socks. Readiness Based Sparing places special focus on spares needed from technical maintenance and battle damage repair angle, reducing the range of spares to be provisioned. Transfer of provisioning functions to maintainers will bring in the much-needed agility and availability in spares support. Today perpetual shortages of critically required spare parts are constraining maintainers to support systems through repair and restore, a sure recipe for force hollowness.
A formalized equipment capability assessment protocol for artillery systems is the need of the hour to measure residual equipment capability of systems deployed at LAC. This will enable replacements of parts that drive readiness and guarantee required mission capability of guns as per mission needs.
It can be used as an effective mechanism to audit and quantify operational readiness of units and identify equipment capability gaps. Post such fitness for mission evaluation, platforms can be grouped under the categories of No Capability Readiness (NCR), Partial Capability Readiness (PCR) and Full Capability Readiness (FCR). Designating platforms under these acronyms rather than conventional Equipment out of Action or Vehicle Off Road will hopefully get noticed by the top brasses and could provide the necessary impetus for remedial measures like adequate budgetary support for spare parts, upgrades, new acquisition, localisation of supply chain, etc. A lot has been debated about the petering off of the Russian offensive towards Kiev, had such a mission compatibility assessment done in advance, this loss of face could have been avoided.
Operations and Engineering: Understanding Metrics of CR It is important to understand the connection between combat operations and equipment capability. Sustaining equipment capability through life, both during peace and war is critical to military capability. Just as any Air Force or an airline cannot carry out sustained air operations without engineering, conducting sustained/ prolonged ground combat of the kind being seen in East Europe is not feasible without close engineering support. In – Service engineering and operations are two sides of the same coin.
Common metrics that are considered at the design stage are mean round between stoppages, mean round between system aborts (MRBSA), maintenance ratio, mean time to repair, mean down time, etc. It can be laid down as a policy that a legacy system should be able to demonstrate these metrics with minimum 80% confidence. It is through such prescribed and meticulous audit that CR can be incubated in battle plans and the practice of leaving equipment issues for the successor is given a break. If a newly acquired howitzer has a MRBSA of 1000 rounds, the in -Service threshold could be fixed at more than 800 hundred rounds, mission abort being defined as a failure that prevents or degrades a mission essential function like rate of fire, accuracy, range , speed of move, etc .
Available Options
The Dhanush and ATAGS were to be the backbone of the Artillery but their acquisition has been delayed. Up gunning of 130 mm is proceeding as per plans. While K9 and ULH remain relatively modern armaments in the inventory, bulk of systems comprise the 105mm IFG/LFG and Bofors. RFIs for the 155 mm towed and mounted gun systems have been issued. The acquisition process will follow its own time lines. Then there is the new view point from drone advocates that conventional artillery will gradually get replaced by drones being more accurate, cheaper and having the ability to record target hit and destruction that can be used for psychological operations.
However, as with tanks, drones will revolutionise warfare alongside artillery and not replace it at least in our context. Drones need line of sight for control and carry limited amount of explosive. Their efficacy in mountains in high winds, rain, snow and freezing temperatures would get degraded, artillery will still be able to fire and destroy adversary or pin them down. Tube artillery`s all -weather capability is a distinct advantage over aerial platforms specially at the LAC. Hence all out efforts need to be made to keep artillery systems in a full mission capable state. The approach could be:–
- Maintain legacy systems in as it is state—same or degraded capability using repaired or rolled over LRUs.
- Modernise legacy systems to current standards- Enhanced capability in terms of range, accuracy, survivability, supportability and better ammunition. Tests have shown that an Excalibur shell can accurately hit a target that would normally take 10 to 50 non- guided shells. Similarly, development of smart fuses that can convert artillery shells into smart munitions with CEP below 50 metres could be considered. Insensitive munitions are another area to be considered from safety angle.
- Accelerate acquisition process through pragmatic QRs and an evolutionary approach. The introduction of primary
and secondary requirements will provide the designer non-conflicting primary requirements and latitude in trade-off of secondary requirements e.g. the total weight controversy that surface in most QRs has to be decided in the realms of Newtonian mechanics. One can`t include contrarian QRs of maximum range and minimum weight for a system. If at all this is indispensable, it needs to adopt the evolutionary approach of transient and objective QRs to accelerate indigenous development. - Resilience is a dimension of CR that demonstrates a military
s ability to absorb, withstand and rapidly recover from adverse impacts of enemy attacks. It reflects a nations ability to pursue its national defence strategy for extended durations. Resilience cannot be built with heavy import dependencies of arms, ammunition and other military technologies. A local industrial base and supply chain is sine qua non. - Revisit in -service engineering support being done for newly introduced systems like ULH, K9 and Dhanush and bring in the concept of TLCR and capability enhancement programmes. Time to bring in a reliability centred medium reset of tube artillery, 8-10 years post induction into service.
Conclusion
Dysfunctional or unreliable weapons will end up creating critical gaps in war fighting during surges of continuous operations or combat pulses, often to the detriment of the Infantry soldier. This war in Ukraine has shown that future wars can be industrial scale wars, prolonged, long duration, accompanied by massive attrition. It has demonstrated how modern technologies can orchestrate widespread violence and destruction. Losses of artillery pieces alone are reported to be around 9000 and ammunition fired is reported to be close to 700,000 tonnes.
Seeing the emerging threats in the sub-continent, military effectiveness requires that the military prepares for operations over long durations. This will be feasible only if major platforms are designed, manufactured and maintained within the country alongside a localized supply chain to replace or regenerate daily losses.
We have to look at a fine balance between combat usefulness, cost and complexity of technologies when seeking new capabilities. A systematic approach is needed and trade-offs used to adjust required and conflicting QRs, to support self-reliance. In the interim, capability upgrades of vintage systems using current technologies need to be considered to cover risks and plug capability gaps.
