It is a well-deliberated fact that India did not use its airpower in the 1962 war and that became the primary reason for China gaining upper hand.
This May, the latest Chinese incursion will complete one year with agreeable disengagement yet out of sight. This face-off at LAC in the eastern Ladakh area has brought out the reality yet again, that the Sino-Indian border dispute is one of the major deterrents in the peaceful co-existence of the two Asian giants.
The dastardly act by the PLA soldiers at Galwan in June 2020 made many speculate revision of the 1962 aggression (maybe that was the idea of China) but the brave soldiers of the Indian Army gave a befitting reply to an adversary which created the effect of shock and awe. The difference between India of 1962 and 2020 was made further clear to China by gaining an advantageous position at Kailash Range in August, thus neutralising the scope of further misadventure by the PLA. This pre-emptive move brought China to the talking table and India’s decision to continue with a forward deployment through the winter blunted Chinese aggressive behaviour.
Present situation
After nine rounds of talks between the respective army commanders, the issue of Pangong Tso has been resolved and PLA has disengaged from the North and the South banks. Important point is that forces have disengaged from the said area but are in a position to form up again at short notice as the overall situation is still tense.
The forces at Depsang planes, Hot springs and Demchok area are still at loggerheads and awaiting a possible democratic solution. China’s illogical demand of de-escalation before disengagement at this point shows that an amicable solution is still not in sight. Hence Indian forces need to continue the present status i.e. be fully prepared for any eventuality.
Importance of Airpower
It is a well-deliberated fact that India did not use its air power in the 1962 war and that became the primary reason for China gaining upper hand. The terrain all along the LAC and capability of the Indian Air Force (IAF), suggests that airpower will still be the dominant factor in case of any conflict in the Mountains.
Not only in the Indian context (the 1971 war and the Kargil conflict), but in many scenarios since World War 2, judicious use of airpower has ensured victory because of inherent characteristics of speed, mobility, flexibility and responsiveness of AirPower. The typical terrain of Eastern Ladakh, which has the world’s highest battlefield—the Siachen glacier—and the highest plateau of Tibet next to it, demands wise employment of air resources.
Quick Comparison between the two Air Forces
People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is the second biggest air force in the world whereas IAF is the fourth largest. PLAAF’s mammoth fleet of fighter aircraft and advanced air defence systems pose an intimidating challenge to the IAF’s limited fleet size.
PLAAF has an inventory of more than 2,000 combat aircraft, which is more than double the IAF’s 900 combat aircraft. PLAAF has a long-range strategic bomber fleet and holds more strategic assets such as airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and combat drones compared with the IAF.[i]
On the other hand, pilots of the IAF possess hands-on experience in high-altitude combat missions. The strategic location of bases near the LAC ensures uninterrupted support for India’s aerial assets. Combat-proven aerial platforms such as Mirage-2000, Su-30 MKI, Rafale, AH-64E Apache and CH-47F Chinook ensure reliability during conflicts, while the modern fleet of transport aircraft enables rapid transfer of equipment and supplies to the Indian Army and Air Force in areas of operation.
Although the PLAAF has started inducting J-20, which was claimed to be a fifth-generation fighter for its stealth features, it is believed to be not superior to Rafale, a 4.5-generation aircraft that India has inducted in the year 2020.[ii]
The speed of deployment and sustainability of ground forces depends on the transport fleet of any air force. India’s fleet of strategic air lifters includes C-17 and IL-76, which ensure rapid transfer of troops, equipment and supplies to airbases near the LAC, which is the need of the hour for ground forces on the battlefield. The PLAAF’s comparatively smaller fleet of strategic airlift assets includes Y-20 and Ilyushin aircraft which are less in number when compared.
India has a stronger regional airpower, with a large number of airfields in the east and west, so even if some airfields are down, operations can continue from other locations.
Hence, while PLAAF may be a bigger air force when compared to the IAF, in terms of fleet and strategic inventory, but the IAF deploys more reliable platforms and strategic bases, combined with experienced troops. If an India-China land conflict should erupt, then India would have better air capability over the Tibetan plateau, as many of the IAF aircraft are capable of flying at high altitudes in all-weather conditions with support from nearby airbases. PLAAF aircraft may have to fly with limited supplies and fuel because of geographic constraints.
The high altitude of Chinese air bases in Tibet and Xinjiang, plus the generally difficult geographic and weather conditions of the region, means that Chinese fighters are limited to carrying around half their design payload and fuel. In-flight refuelling would be required for PLAAF forces to maximise their strike capacity. Whereas the refueller aircraft are woefully inadequate to support the entire strike fleet of the PLAAF. China also lacks the redundancy and related force survivability compared to India in their comparative numbers of regional airbases.
In sum, India has a stronger regional air position, with a large number of airfields in the east and west, so even if some airfields are down, operations can continue from other locations. PLAAF training and experience shortcomings that are not shared by the IAF amplify China’s air disadvantage. Recent PLAAF exercises with unscripted scenarios have found that pilots are excessively reliant upon ground control for tactical direction.
In unanticipated combat scenarios, this dependence on explicit control tower guidance becomes extreme, while “ground commands” are simultaneously often unable to keep up with the complex and changeable air situation. This suggests that PLAAF combat proficiency may be significantly weaker than often estimated.[iii]
It is a well-deliberated fact that India did not use its airpower in the 1962 war and that became the primary reason for China gaining upper hand.
The PLA could resort to the use of its numerically superior tactical ballistic/cruise missiles and unmanned drones with conventional warheads in these missions to offset the shortcomings of its air force. However, missiles are handicapped because of their having only a single-shot capability. Therefore, if the IAF improves on its already existing facilities to ensure proper active/passive AD and rehabilitation capabilities at its airfields and radar sites, it could weather the Chinese onslaught.
Alongside, it could use this very shortcoming of the PLAAF to its advantage to achieve air superiority/favourable air situation in the battle zone. Once this is achieved, the IAF could not only remove the danger of PLAAF interfering with ground operations but also provide much needed close air support to the Indian army to help it ward off numerically larger Chinese ground forces. In this scenario, even a stalemate without loss of territory on either side would be tantamount to a strategic victory for India.[iv]
Conclusion
In any future conflict with China, airpower will be a critical factor. China will not be able to optimise its airpower potential for reasons discussed earlier. There are innumerable other measures that India needs to undertake for it to be able to deter an adversary like China from provoking unnecessarily.
India must concentrate on the core issue of capacity build up all the time to reduce threat differential. It is important for India to keep the Chinese engaged politically and diplomatically in order to avoid major conflict situations while having the potential to challenge aggressiveness as an instrument of deterrence.
[i] Ajay, ‘India Vs China: Air Power Compared’, https://www.airforce-technology.com/features/india-vs-china-indian-air-force-iaf-vs-peoples-liberation-army-air-force-plaaf/#:~:text=The%20Chinese%20Air%20Force%2C%20the,bases%2C%20combined%20with%20experienced%20troops.
[ii] ibid
[iii] EurAsian Times Global Desk, ‘India-China War: US Study Explains Why Indian Air Force Could Outgun China In A Border Conflict’, July 24, 2020, https://eurasiantimes.com/india-china-war-us-reports-explains-why-india-needs-to-use-its-air-force-to-incapacitate-china/
[iv] VK Bhatia, Salute – December 28, 2015, “PLAAF Vs IAF Capability Analysis over Tibetan Plateau”
