It’s twelve years since those horrific attacks by Pakistani terrorists in south Mumbai on 26th November 2008 (26/11), and for many its wounds will perhaps never heal. But for India it was our 9/11 moment, as it significantly altered our understanding of terrorism. Until then, for those in our metros, terrorism was something the security forces and the people battled with in our states that border Pakistan. – Punjab in the 1980s and then Kashmir since 1990 – despite attacks in cities such as Delhi, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Lucknow, Ajmer and Jammu; among others.
And though the trail of evidence in those attacks invariably led to Pakistan, it was the attacks in Mumbai – that have come to be known as 26/11 attacks) – that established beyond doubt the hand of the Pakistani ‘deep state’ in sponsoring attacks in India.
The Pakistani shadow on 26/11
In fact, Lt. Gen Shuja Pasha, who was Pakistan’s DG, ISI at the time of the attacks, had admitted that ‘Log hamaray thay, operation hamara nahin thha’ to Hussain Haqqani, who was Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington, in their meeting in the US on December 24-25, 2008 that Hussain Haqqani has recounted in his book on India Pakistan relations in 2017. And he also alluded to that in his meeting with General Michael Hayden, then the CIA chief, since Pakistan was on the payroll of the US, those days.
The General expresses dismay at Pakistan’s devious ways. But couldn’t the US have done more, specially as American citizens too had been killed? Even Mr Obama – on his visit to Mumbai as US President – paid homage to the victims but avoided a mention of Pakistan in those attacks, because the US had chosen that sponsor of terrorism to be its ‘non-NATo military ally’ and needed Pakistan’s land routes into Afghanistan to keep its troops battling terrorists in the wrong country, Afghanistan. Like so many errors of judgment, this too was one, as explained by Carlotta Gall in her book “The Wrong Enemy” in 2014.
The manner in which the LeT’s leader, Hafiz Saeed, was brought before the courts last week (on 19th November) in fancy SUVs with bodyguards, leaves no room for doubt, that he is privy to ‘state secrets’ and his tribe of terrorists are still valuable assets of the Pakistan army.
Eventually the ball stopped at the doors of the then Indian government in Delhi. But the Indian government led by the mild mannered Dr Manmohan Singh, preferred only a measured response, even though he did say that: “There is enough evidence to show that, given the sophistication and military precision of the attack, it must have had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan.” Had he chosen a tougher response – such as a retaliatory air strikes – as Mr Modi did after the Pulwama attack on Balakot, more so as the IAF had reportedly indicated that it had a 48 hour window after the attacks to do so, then relations between India and Pakistan would have unfolded differently.
His apologists would argue differently, but it clear that since the surgical strikes – post the Pakistani led attacks on Uri and Pulwama – India’s message has gone down to GHQ Rawalpindi where the master minds of terrorism sit. India could have targeted a range of terrorist camps in POK – since it is technically Indian territory – and the world would have applauded India’s willingness to confront terror.
Confronting terror
As some news channels talked about war, Pakistan readied itself for an Indian military strike. And had India responded with retaliatory air strikes, a Pakistani military response – as part of their denial strategy – would have been more like the post-Balakot air strike, a charade. And if it chose to use ground forces, pressure from the world capitals, specially the US (that too had lost its citizens too in Mumbai’s 26/11 terror attack), would have stopped the Pakistani army in its tracks.
And though the trail of evidence in those attacks invariably led to Pakistan, it was the attacks in Mumbai – that have come to be known as 26/11 attacks) – that established beyond doubt the hand of the Pakistani ‘deep state’ in sponsoring attacks in India.
There was enormous public outrage, and even fear in cities that anyone was at risk now, not just those in Jammu & Kashmir, where gun battles between our security forces and the terrorists were a regular phenomenon. And the impressive performance of the ‘black cat’ commandos of NSG – despite the delay in their deployment – had led to demands for deployment NSG type teams in all metros (Mumbai, Bangalore, etc..), with the state police forces being prodded by the politicians and the public – after the embarrassing performance of Mumbai police – to train and get their act together with counter terrorism technology and techniques.
But the event was soon overshadowed by India’s election process and the cricket fever of the Indian Premier League season, and our priorities changed! However, at a more functional level there were changes – like the security checks at the entrance of five star hotels- even though the shoddy security men at public places like shopping malls were and remain a joke. But Pakistan having created the monster of terrorism wasn’t goining to abandon them in a hurry, whatever the pressures from the international community – like the FATF and UNSC resolutions – and India.
How Pakistan does that is explained in detail by Saroj Rath in his book ‘Fragile Frontiers’. The overwhelming evidence of the 26/11 attacks however pointed to the Pakistan army’s doors – the military professionalism and precision of the terrorists, data on their GPS phones, and maps used by the attackers, and this has been has been detailed by Stephen Tankel in his book on the LeT, or Lashkar e Taiba, titled : “Storming the World Stage’, for those who still question whether Pakistan’s deep state was involved in the attacks on Mumbai, when 180 people were killed.
The 26/11 attack for India was our 9/11 moment, as it significantly altered our understanding of terrorism.
Moreover the manner in which the LeT’s leader, Hafiz Saeed, was brought before the courts last week (on 19th November) in fancy SUVs with bodyguards, leaves no room for doubt, that he is privy to ‘state secrets’ and his tribe of terrorists are still valuable assets of the Pakistan army.
For India, the 26/11 attacks created an awareness that any of the major cities of India could be targets – cities that have foreigners, corporate houses, celebrities and the common man – and were at potential risk anywhere now. In that sense, the 26/11 attack were India’s 9/11 moment.
The overwhelming evidence of the 26/11 attacks pointed to the Pakistan army’s doors
And though the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai captured international media attention with about 180 people killed – including many Westerners – terrorism had been a major political and security concern in India since the 1980s. First in Punjab, followed by the turmoil in Kashmir valley, and with terror attacks in many Indian cities such as Delhi, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Lucknow, Ajmer and Jammu; among others. The trail almost always has led to Pakistan.
The question is: ‘are we any better prepared for the next attack?’
The story earlier appeared on timesnownews.com (https://www.timesnownews.com/columns/article/2611-attacks-were-indias-911-moment/686955)