Let me start with my personal experience on the subject by stating that command of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia in 1992/93 was a great honour & a privilege. It was a professional challenge that was in many ways the high point of my Service career. Something I look back to with a great sense of achievement, satisfaction and fulfilment. I had the unique privilege of having uniformed personnel from about 34 countries of the world under my command and many more in the civilian field.
Without any reservations whatsoever or an attempt at false modesty, I attribute my ability to have been able to handle the assignment effectively to the excellent grounding received in the Indian Army and the high standards of professionalism that are the hallmarks of our system.
Most of you are probably not aware that I did NOT have any Indian representation on the Mission other than a personal staff officer from the Mechanised Infantry Regiment of which I was then the ‘Colonel’. Philip Campose went in with me as a major and picked up the rank of lieutenant colonel there in a few months. (Incidentally, he retired as the Vice Chief of Army Staff about five years back).
That experience provided me with an unforgettable insight into how the international system operates: the political machinations that are the every-day feature of international activity; the rhetoric and symbolism indulged in by many world leaders and by the governments they represented. In quite a few cases I was privy to the utter hypocrisy of the international community.
Which needless to say, made me a total cynic; a malaise that still lingers. Even so, it was a tremendous experience; because, in addition to dealing with the top leadership of the parties to the conflict in the normal course, I had occasion to interact with many eminent international personalities at various levels.
The second point I wish to make is that I was struck by the dedication of all contingents to the United Nations as an organisation and to its principles and ideals; almost without exception despite the fact that many countries were providing personnel for UN peacekeeping for the first time.
Also, the fact that all personnel including civilians were more than willing to undergo difficulties and face danger without complaining. For all its inadequacies (without doubt many), there does not, at the moment, seem to be anything else to replace the UN. So we must try and make it work and work well.
Without any reservations whatsoever or an attempt at false modesty, I attribute my ability to have been able to handle the assignment effectively to the excellent grounding received in the Indian Army and the high standards of professionalism that are the hallmarks of our system.
Most analysts who have presumed to address the UNPROFOR experience have generally glossed over the fact that the mission was actually set up in March 1992 to deal with the situation in Croatia after a cease-fire was agreed to by the then federal authorities in Belgrade and the newly declared independent Croatian government in Zagreb; for protection of areas within Croatia that had significant Serb minority populations. Ironically, to carry out that task, we were mandated to set up the Mission Headquarters in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) which was at that time (March 1992), still a constituent of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
As it happened, even before the deployment for the tasks in Croatia was completed, BiH literally blew up under our noses in the first week of May 1992.
Talks sponsored by the European Economic Community (EEC as it then was) collapsed, fighting broke out between the Muslims, Serbs and the Croats within BiH, and to cap it all, the Europeans followed by the USA, recognised BiH as an independent republic. As a result, elements of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) deployed in BiH became a new factor in the equation; the Bosnian Serb component detached from the JNA and remained within the Republic to fight for what they perceived was the Serb cause, while the remainder that had an affiliation to Serbia-Montenegro withdrew into the territories of what was left of the FRY.
This prelude was necessary in order to have a clear idea about what the mission had to deal with. By about mid 1992, despite the problems I was faced with handling the situation in Croatia, I was being saddled with additional mandates for BiH, like keeping Sarajevo airport open for induction of humanitarian aid, border control mechanisms, escort of humanitarian aid road convoys, and in due course, monitoring of a no-fly-zone, etc. In so far as the Croatian situation was concerned, whereas there was no resumption of hostilities, there was much posturing and manoeuvring.
In which, sad to say, the USA and the major European powers played a rather dubious role by undermining the mandate of the Mission through the political support extended to the Croatian authorities; at another level, this was compounded by similar support extended to the Serbs by the Russian contingent.
Within BiH, the deteriorating situation led to a UN Sec Co Resolution providing additional forces for deployment into the Republic for protection of humanitarian aid convoys, for monitoring exchange of fire by the belligerents, etc. The main components were from France, Spain, the UK, Canada, the Scandinavian countries, and a contingent each from Ukraine and Egypt. To exercise command of these forces, between Marrack Goulding (the then USG DPKO) and I, we agreed that my then Deputy Force Commander, French General Philipe Morillon would set up a sector headquarters in Sarajevo that would function under my overall command. Staff for this headquarters was provided primarily by the Europeans, through the aegis as it eventually turned out, of NATO resources.
The action I took was possibly the first (and maybe the only) instance in the history of the UN where a person at the level of USG declined an extension in an appointment.
Needless to say, besides the thankless day-to-day problems of dealing with the political leadership of the parties to the conflict, and their warring forces, I found myself having to deal with rather disingenuous efforts by the Americans and the Europeans to smuggle in equipment and personnel for surveillance and intelligence gathering; both of which in those days were taboo in UN peacekeeping. Such activity together with occasional instances of weapons and equipment being smuggled in through UNHCR convoys made the Mission’s position rather awkward, to put it mildly. When the issue was raised, I received an apology from the French, a denial from the UK, and no response from the US authorities.
To the eternal credit of my senior colleagues in the Mission from NATO countries, I must say that not only were they acutely embarrassed by what was being done by their masters in Brussels and respective capitals, but they discreetly kept me informed about what was going on. As a consequence of which, I was invariably in a position to keep things under control. To that extent, I take immense satisfaction in the fact that I was able to command such confidence and respect from a bunch of guys who were outstanding professionals in their own right.
I was on a one-year contract with the UN from 03 March 1992 to 02 March 1993, initially in the grade of Assistant Secretary-General, and later as the Mission content and responsibility grew, my status was upgraded to that of Under Secretary-General. By mid-February 1993 I had made up my mind that I would return to the rolls of the Indian Army on completion of my contract period. On reaching this decision, I tried to contact General SF Rodrigues, my then Chief of Army Staff. He was away on tour and could not be contacted. Hence I spoke to the late JN Dixit the then Foreign Secretary and explained my reasons for the step I proposed to take. He endorsed my decision without any hesitation.
It is another matter altogether that on return to India, I was asked, apparently at the instance of the then Defence Secretary, NN Vohra for an explanation as to why I declined the offer of extension without consulting the Ministry of Defence. Possibly out of pique that I found it appropriate to speak to the Foreign Secretary rather than to the Defence Secretary.
It is again another matter that within a couple of years of our, more or less simultaneous retirement, both of us developed a tremendous relationship and great respect for one another; and worked together on a number of “task forces”, “committees” and so on. The action I took was possibly the first (and maybe the only) instance in the history of the UN where a person at the level of USG declined an extension in an appointment.
Kofi Annan who had taken over as USG DPKO from Marrack Goulding was obviously bowled over by my request for reversion to national duties on completion of the terms of the contract. While he was recovering from the impact of my request, I was frantically contacted by James Aimee, then the late Boutros Boutros Ghali’s Chef-de-Cabinet, among others, not to insist on leaving.
Seeking their indulgence and understanding, I asked them to look for another person to replace me. Since I did not wish to embarrass the SG or the UN, nor did I wish to make the already difficult task of my colleagues in the Mission any more awkward than it already was, the media was informed that I was declining the offer of extension due to family commitments.
For the record, the actual reasons were two. As it happened, in mid-February 1993, my senior civil affairs staff showed me a copy of a noting initiated in DPKO at the instance of some powerful members of the Security Council at that time asking for a restructuring of the command arrangements of UNPROFOR, to bring in an SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary General) to oversee the operations of the Mission, with the Force Commander to be responsible only for exercising control over the military component; as in most major complex UN missions.
Those of you who take the trouble to read the UN Sec Co Resolution of 15 February 1992 setting up UNROFOR, will find that the unique arrangement that I was mandated to undertake was a specific exception consciously taken at that time; that as the Force Commander I would also exercise full oversight over the political, civil affairs, civilian police and administrative content of the mission besides of course, the military.
That I was made aware of developments taking place in New York in February 1993 is a reflection of the fact that the United Nations system leaks like a sieve. While I had no problems with what was proposed, I saw no reason, as someone who had been Number “One”, accepting a status of being Number “Two”. It had nothing to do with ego; I just did not relish the idea.
But the second and equally important reason was what I perceived as efforts by NATO to intrude into the running of what was a UN mission (discreet as they were). There was no way I as the Head of the Mission would have allowed that to happen. And I was also clear that in any confrontation between “NATO” and “Satish Nambiar”, there could be only one loser.
I was therefore not surprised to hear, about three months after I had left, that what I anticipated did in fact take place. My successor, the late General Lars-Eric Wahlgren from Sweden (who I incidentally inter-acted with a number of times in later years) was somewhat unceremoniously replaced as the Force Commander in mid 1993 by a French General (Cot) with a change of command structure that brought in the former Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg (not to be confused with his son who became Prime Minister of Norway) as SRSG.
I am sure Yasushi Akashi of Japan who took over the assignment later would confirm the discomfort he was subjected to by the intrusion of NATO into the conduct of mission operations. I also had occasion to talk with British General Michael Rose who commanded the forces in BiH after Morillon and became privy to his frustration.
To reinforce the point I am making it is possibly appropriate to draw attention to a piece I sent to Simon Adams of the ‘Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect’ in 2015 on the occasion of the anniversary of the Srebrenica episode. It is in many ways illustrative and makes the point about the callousness and indifference of the major powers. An article on similar lines was carried by “The Wire” dated 12 July 2015 under the heading “An Indian General recalls How the World Failed Srebrenica 20 Years Ago”.
20th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide
“A couple of days back I came across a news item stating that during this week the UN Security Council is to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide. I understand that a resolution on the subject has since been vetoed by Russia. Last night I received the statement put out by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.
Reading both these items brought back vivid memories of my experience as the first Force Commander and Head of Mission of the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) from 3rd March 1992 to 2nd March 1993, and reminded me of the fact that had the international community then addressed the situation in the proper perspective, the incident should never have taken place. Nor the genocide in Rwanda where many more innocent civilians became victims.
The unfortunate irony is that all too often, rhetoric and symbolism replace logic and action, in the hallowed portals of the Security Council chambers. And in that knowledge, I feel prompted to relate one of the experiences as the Head of that Mission that has a bearing on the subject even if somewhat indirectly.
Starting with a reminder to the analysts and historians who set out views on the Balkans crisis of the early 1990s, that UNPROFOR was set up to deal with the situation in Croatia, and without going into the other details of the Mission, let me state that by early May 1992 the Mission was faced with the reality of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) blowing up under our noses, as it were, situated as the Mission Headquarters then was; in Sarajevo.
Remaining on the main theme of this piece, by October 1992 (by which time the Mission Headquarters had been relocated to Zagreb), there was much fighting taking place between the three communities in BiH (Muslim, Serb and Croat). In recognition of which, the UN Security Council had mandated UNPROFOR with a number of responsibilities, including keeping Sarajevo airport open for the induction of humanitarian aid supplies, etc. There was yet no peacekeeping mandate for Bosnia-Herzegovina; at least not till I left the mission on 2nd March 1993.
To provide the ‘muscle’ for execution of the mandate of humanitarian assistance, additional contingents from France, United Kingdom, Spain, Canada, Egypt, and Ukraine, were made available, and a Sector headquarters set up in Sarajevo. With my concurrence, Phillipe Morillon, my French Deputy Force Commander and great friend and colleague, was deputed to head the forces in BiH, and replaced on my staff by an equally competent Canadian General, Robert Gaudreau.
Sometime in the third week of October 1992, I received a frantic call from Marrack Goulding, the then Under Secretary-General for UN Peacekeeping, apprising me that there was great pressure on the UN SG (Boutros Boutros Ghali) and UN DPKO to initiate measures to declare seven areas, including Sarajevo, that were then under threat in BiH, as “safe areas”. In response, I enquired from him what was the perception of a “safe area” in New York. After a minute’s silence, he candidly admitted they did not have the ‘foggiest’ idea and asked me what my interpretation was.
Without any hesitation whatsoever, I gave him my military interpretation; in brief, that a “safe area” is a geographically delineated entity, which would be secured militarily all around, then cleared on the inside of all unauthorised weapons and ammunition, and entry into the area would be physically monitored by armed UN troops to ensure that no armed personnel from outside be permitted entry, nor would any weapons or lethal equipment be allowed in.
That interpretation appeared to be logical enough to satisfy Marrack. He then asked me what resources I would require to implement the task of securing the designated “safe areas”. Needless to say, my response was that I would require at least 24 hours for working out the details in consultation with my sub-ordinate commanders and staff.
My staff in Zagreb that included the Deputy Head of Mission and Director Civil Affairs Cedric Thornberry, Deputy Force Commander, Major General Gaudreau , Chief of Staff, Danish Brigadier General, Svend Harders, together with Lieutenant General Phillipe Morillon and his staff in Sarajevo led by, a British Major General Cordy Smith, and many others, worked over 24 hours to produce an eminently workable arrangement, that I endorsed with some marginal adjustments.
The next evening (given the time difference between Zagreb and New York) when Marrack Goulding called me, I was in a position to give him a well thought out military assessment for implementing a “safe area” concept in BiH. Responding to his query about the requirement of troops to execute the tasks, I informed him that, as worked out by the Mission, we would require an additional force of four and a half divisions (approximately 55,000 to 60,000 troops) to implement such a mandate. I imagine that he would have almost fallen off his chair in New York on hearing that.
As it happened, Marrack Goulding thanked me for the response and signed off. I did not hear anything more on the subject till I left the mission on 2nd March 1993 on completion of my contractual obligation of one year, and declining an offer of an extension. It was therefore with deep regret and some consternation that, in following events in the Balkans after my return to India, I noted the declaration of places like Srebrenica as “safe areas” without the deployment of the requisite number of troops. To that extent, the genocide at Srebrenica was without doubt a failure of the international community represented by the United Nations. (As was Rwanda)
It would not possibly surprise discerning practitioners and maybe some analysts, that when IFOR forces moved into Bosnia-Herzegovina after the signing of the Dayton Agreement, the total troop strength was about 60,000. More or less the same strength worked out by us in UNPROFOR in October 1992; and that without an agreement to a cease-fire by the parties to the conflict.
It is possibly appropriate to conclude this piece by recalling what India’s then Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Hardeep Puri had to say on 24 July 2009 during the debate in the General Assembly pertaining to the concept of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: “It has been India’s consistent view that the responsibility to protect its population is one of the foremost responsibilities of every state”. He stressed that “Willingness to take Chapter VII measures can only be on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations with a specific proviso that such action should only be taken when peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail in discharging their duty”.
In emphasising the need to be realistic he further stated, “We do not live in an ideal world and therefore need to be cognisant that creation of new norms should at the same time completely safeguard against their misuse. In this context, the responsibility to protect should in no way provide a pretext for humanitarian intervention or unilateral action.”
And he concluded thus: “Even a cursory examination of reasons for non-action by the UN, especially the Security Council, reveals that in respect of the tragic events that were witnessed by the entire world, non-action was not due to lack of warning, resources or the barrier of state sovereignty, but because of strategic, political or economic considerations of those on whom the present international architecture had placed the onus to act. The key aspect, therefore, is to address the issue of willingness to act, in which context a necessary ingredient is real reform of the decision making bodies in the UN like the Security Council in its permanent membership.”
The prevailing global security environment
We are passing through a decisive stage in the history of the international system. Though the threat of war between great states or nuclear confrontation between major powers are well behind us and in fact fading in our memory, new and diverse forms of threats, some clear and present, others only dimly perceived, test our resolve and question the validity of our existing mechanisms. Developments at the international level over the last two decades have exposed deep divisions within the membership of the UN over fundamental policies on peace and security.
They have included debates on how best to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (including chemical and biological weapons), and combat the spread of international terrorism, the criteria for the use of force and the role of the UN Security Council, the effectiveness of unilateral versus multilateral responses to security, the notion of preventive war, and the place of the UN in a world that has been dominated for some time by a single superpower.
These debates emerge after several years of agonising debate on issues of no less importance. Such as our collective response to civil wars; the effectiveness of existing mechanisms in responding to genocide; so-called ethnic cleansing and other severe violations of human rights; changing notions of state sovereignty; and the need to more tightly link the challenges of peace and the challenges of development.
There is little doubt that aspects of restructuring and institutional reform of the United Nations machinery and its organs to meet the new challenges need to be addressed. The changes called for are not merely a matter of the functioning of the UN Secretariat and other such administrative details. The changes need to focus on the world body’s character and ethos.
The use of force should only be considered after all other options have been exhausted. And the fact that force can be legally used does not always mean that it should be used.
The mechanism of preventive deployment is without doubt a most useful tool. Even so there can be little argument that prevention often fails. And when that happens, threats will have to be met by military means. The UN Charter provides a clear framework for the use of force. States have an inherent right to self-defence, enshrined in Article 51. Long-established customary international law makes it clear that states can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it, and the action is proportionate.
Equally, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter provides the international community represented by the Security Council, with the authority to deal with situations where military force needs to be applied against an errant state that resorts to aggression against another member state.
On preventive use of military force by member states to deal with not-so-imminent threats, there is clearly a view that States that fear the emergence of distant threats have an obligation to bring such concerns to the notice of the Security Council for appropriate action. And there is general acceptance that on this specific aspect, the Security Council would need to be more pro-active than before.
The use of force should only be considered after all other options have been exhausted. And the fact that force can be legally used does not always mean that it should be used.
The aspect of the responsibility of the international community to protect innocent civilians who are victims of genocide is another sensitive one. In the context of the fact that state sovereignty is still a very important issue for most developing countries that have emerged from colonial rule not too long back. Notwithstanding all the developments at the global level, the concept of state sovereignty remains at the root of the international system. Even so, there appears to be some consensus that in the 21st Century such sovereignty cannot be absolute.
The emerging norm of a collective responsibility to protect civilians from large-scale violence has been endorsed: a responsibility that lies first and foremost with national authorities. When a state fails to protect its civilians or is incapable of doing so, the international community would appear to have a responsibility to act, through humanitarian operations, monitoring missions, and diplomatic pressure; and with force if necessary as a very last resort. The reality of course, is that the international community remains largely indifferent unless the vital interest of one or more of the important players is directly affected. Even when there is consensus that force has to be applied, resources are not always readily available or forthcoming.
Notwithstanding the internal challenges India faces, and the imperative need to focus on economic growth, it would be prudent for the governing establishment and the strategic community in the country to dwell on the fact that within the international setting as we enter the third decade of the 21st Century and probably beyond, India will have a role to play both regionally and globally.
Internationally, the situation is that most countries, including major players like the USA, European Union, Russia, Japan, as also possibly some of the regional organisations, would without much doubt, like to see India play a more active role in promoting democratic values and contributing to stability in the region.
Primarily because of the perception that India has the ability to do so, as also because of their desire not to be directly involved in many cases. The only element that could inhibit the Indian establishment in developing the appropriate military capability to support such a role is perhaps the ability to build a national consensus in this regard.
In preparing ourselves for continued participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, it would be appropriate to take stock of the changes that have taken place in the environment in which such operations are being increasingly mounted in recent years, and the manner in which they are being executed. The end of the Cold War and the euphoria generated by the success of the Gulf War in 1991, resulted in the international community (particularly the dominant Western powers), assuming a greater role in the maintenance of international peace and security. There was therefore a greater demand for United Nations peacekeeping operations.
The perceived setbacks suffered by the Organisation in its efforts in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and inadequacy of response to the situation in Rwanda were not actually attributable to any deficiency in the performance of peacekeepers. They were occasioned by the confused mandates issued by the Security Council and the lack of political backstopping. Even so they induced a sense of retrenchment. There is therefore a more measured approach in the developed world to the aspect of participation in UN peacekeeping.
We must take into account the radical changes in the nature of the peacekeeping commitment. UN peacekeepers are increasingly being sent to regions where civil-war type situations prevail; where there are no agreements, or if there are, these are rather tenuous, or broken without compunction; where the consent or cooperation of the belligerent parties cannot be relied upon; where constitutional authority does not exist in many cases, or if it does, it has limited authority.
In such situations, today’s peacekeepers are not only required to keep the warring parties apart to the extent they can, but are increasingly called upon to safeguard humanitarian relief operations, monitor human rights violations, assist in mine clearance, monitor state boundaries or borders, provide civilian police support, assist in rebuilding logistics infrastructure like roads, railways, bridges, and to support electoral processes.
In much of this the Indian Armed Forces have practical experience based on the conduct of counter-insurgency operations in North East India (Nagaland, Mizoram, Tripura, Manipur and Assam), Jammu and Kashmir (since 1989), and Punjab; thus providing our forces with a marked advantage over most other forces from other parts of the world.
India and United Nations peacekeeping operations
It is probably not very widely known that there is no specific provision for peacekeeping in the UN Charter. It was an invention of the UN Secretary General and the Secretariat, evolved in the late 1940s as a non-coercive instrument of conflict control, at a time when Cold War constraints precluded the use of the more forceful steps permitted under the Charter. During the Cold War, neither of the two Super Powers was amenable to United Nations intervention against their allies or within their spheres of influence. Hence an improvisation – peacekeeping without combat connotations – emerged.
As it evolved over the years, United Nation peacekeeping became an extraordinary art that called for the use of the military personnel not to wage war but to prevent fighting between belligerents. Unarmed military observers provided by member states were deployed under the authority of a Security Council Resolution, to ensure the maintenance of cease-fires, and to provide, by their presence, a measure of stability in an area of conflict while negotiations were conducted. Hence, peacekeeping is based on a triad of principles that give it legitimacy, as well as credibility; namely, consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality of the peacekeepers, and the use of force by lightly armed peacekeepers only in self-defence.
As it evolved over the years, United Nation peacekeeping became an extraordinary art that called for the use of the military personnel not to wage war but to prevent fighting between belligerents.
As one of the founding members of the United Nations, India’s contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security has been second to none. In no other field of activity has this been manifested more than in UN operations commencing with our participation in the operations in Korea in 1950. The operation in Korea, led by the USA, was a major military undertaking. India participated militarily with a medical unit comprising 17 officers, 9 junior commissioned officers, and 300 other ranks.
We then provided a Custodian Force of 231 officers, 203 junior commissioned officers, and 5696 other ranks under the command of Major General (later Lieutenant General) SPP Thorat for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission of which the Chairman was Lieutenant General (later General) KS Thimayya. India also contributed significantly to the Indo-China Supervisory Commission deployed in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam from 1954 to 1970; a medical detachment from 1964 to 1968, and 970 officers, 140 junior commissioned officers and 6157 other ranks over the period 1954 to 1970.
The use of armed military contingents for peacekeeping was first authorised by the Security Council for deployment with the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai after the Arab-Israeli war in 1956. From 15 November 1956 to 19 May 1967, eleven infantry battalions from India successively served with this force: a total of 393 officers, 409 junior commissioned officers (JCOs), and 12393 other ranks (ORs) in all. Major General (later Lieutenant General) PS Gyani and Brigadier (later Major General) IJ Rikhye were force commanders in this operation. This operation became a model for many subsequent peacekeeping operations. The success of UNEF led the Security Council to readily accept a request by the Congo in 1960 for intervention on attaining independence from Belgium.
The United Nations accepted responsibility for ending secession and re-unifying the country. The rules of engagement were modified to cater for use of force in pursuance of the mandate, for carrying out humanitarian tasks, and to deal with well-armed and organised mercenaries.
India’s contribution to this operation was not only substantial but most vital. Between 14 July 1960 and 30 June 1964, two Indian brigades comprising a total of 467 officers, 404 JCOs, and 11354 ORs participated. 36 Indian personnel lost their lives in the operation, and 124 were wounded; Captain GS Salaria of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Gorkha Rifles was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra.
The operations in Cyprus, launched in 1964, saw three Indian force commanders; Lieutenant General PS Gyani, General KS Thimayya, who died in harness on 18 December 1965, and Major General Diwan Prem Chand. Major General (later Lieutenant General) Prem Chand also distinguished himself as the force commander in the operations in Namibia in 1989, which oversaw that country’s transition to independence.
With the increased commitment in peacekeeping assumed by the UN in the post Cold War era, India continued to provide commanders, military observers and staff officers to many of the UN missions deployed to keep the peace in various parts of the world. In Iran and Iraq in 1988/90 after the bloody conflict in the region; on the Iraqi-Kuwait border after the Gulf War in 1991; Angola in 1989/91, and again in 1995/99; Central America in 1990/92; El Salvador in 1991; Liberia in 1993; Rwanda in 1994/96; Sierra Leone in 1998/2001; Lebanon from 1998 to date; Ethiopia-Eritrea in 2001/2009; the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1999 to date; Cote d’Ivoire from 2003 to date, Burundi in 2003/2006; Sudan/South Sudan from 2005 to date, and the Golan Heights from 2006 to date.
India has also provided police personnel to a number of United Nations missions. As in Namibia, Western Sahara, Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Congo, Liberia (where it created history by providing all-women formed police units that drew acclaim locally as well as internationally) and in Sudan/South Sudan.
In addition, sizeable military contingents were made available for the UN operations in Cambodia in 1992/93 (a total of 2550 all ranks in two successive battalion groups); in Mozambique in 1992/93 (a total of about 1000 all ranks); Somalia in 1993/94 (a brigade group totalling about 5000 all ranks); Angola in 1995 (a battalion group and an engineer company totalling over 1000 all ranks); Rwanda in 1994/95 (a total of about 800 all ranks); in Sierra Leone in 2000/2001 (a Force Commander and a contingent comprising 131 officers, 163 JCOs and 2613 ORs together with 14 military observers and 31 staff officers); and in Ethiopia-Eritrea in 2001-2009 (a battalion group and a Force Commander).
In so far as the former Yugoslavia is concerned, the Government of India had, at the request of the then United Nations’ Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, deputed me as the first Force Commander and Head of Mission, in which capacity I set up the operation that comprised uniformed personnel from about 34 countries, together with civil affairs and administrative personnel from many more (a total of over 28,000), and ran it from 03 March 1992 to 02 March 1993.
The current deployment of 5439 personnel reflects the commitment of troops, military observers and staff officers, and civilian police, from India in eight of the 13 current UN operations. Which includes 2342 personnel and the Force Commander in South Sudan, 2007 personnel in the Congo, 762 personnel in Lebanon, and 175 personnel in the Golan Heights. We have had the privilege of providing the first military adviser in Major General I J Rikhye at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations when it was formed over five decades ago: and two others subsequently: Lt Gen RS Mehta in early 2000 and more recently, Lt Gen Abhijit Guha.
India’s spontaneous and unreserved participation in UN peacekeeping operations over the years has been a clear demonstration of the country’s commitment to the objectives set out in the UN Charter. Not in terms of rhetoric and symbolism, but in real and practical terms, with approximately 240,000 personnel over the years, and even to the extent of accepting casualties to personnel (about 150 fatalities to date).
India’s spontaneous and unreserved participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations over the years has been a clear demonstration of the country’s commitment to the objectives set out in the UN Charter.
This commitment has been acknowledged by the international community, successive Secretaries-General and the United Nations Secretariat. But even more significantly, the effectiveness of such participation and commitment to United Nations peacekeeping efforts has drawn respect and praise from fellow professionals of other countries and many others that have served jointly with our commanders, observers, police monitors and contingents, in various parts of the world. Hence, the image of the Indian forces in the international arena is that of highly competent and well-trained professionals.
It is important for the people of our country to recognise that much of our participation in United Nations’ peacekeeping operations relates to national security interests. Our participation in the Korean and Cambodian operations demonstrated our stake in the stability of East and South East Asia. Our vital interests in West Asia, both in terms of our energy requirements and our historical connections, have been more than adequately reflected in our participation in the peacekeeping operations undertaken in the Gaza Strip and Sinai, the Golan Heights, Iran/Iraq, Iraq/Kuwait, Lebanon and Yemen.
Our geo-strategic interests in the stability and well-being of the newly emerged states of Africa, have been underscored by our contributions and participation in the operations in the Congo, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sudan, Burundi, and Cote d’Ivoire. In fact, it is of some significance that India has participated in every United Nations peacekeeping operation in Africa (with one possible exception being the most recent one in Mali).
The use of force in UN peacekeeping operations
Use of force is not necessarily a panacea for all the problems in mission areas. Experiences of combat operations undertaken by multi-national forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Yemen and so on, clearly suggest that the use of force has to complemented and supplemented by political efforts for reconciliation and by peace-building activity for the restoration of governance, infrastructure, rule of law mechanisms, etc. To that extent, it may be desirable that the use of force by peacekeepers be limited to actions required to be taken for the ‘protection of innocent civilians’.
Use of force by United Nations’ peacekeepers means appropriate resources must be available. In almost all United Nations missions deployed today this is wanting because those who have the resources, both in terms of trained manpower and equipment, namely countries of the developed world, are not participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations.
If UN peacekeeping is to remain effective, the developed world must return to the commitment. And this should go beyond the present arrangement of seeking positions in senior management and command, to the provision of “boots on the ground” and equipment resources.
I think it is imperative that the United Nations should be prepared to undertake peacekeeping operations in intra-state conflict at the request of, and after agreement with the belligerents, wherein the use of force to implement the terms of the agreement is mandated by the United Nations Security Council, and adequate resources for the purpose are made available to the United Nations Force. It needs to be stressed that United Nations forces should only be inserted for such operations after an agreement between the belligerents has been arrived at.
After insertion, if sporadic acts of violence are initiated by elements not responsive to the signatories, like warlords acting on their own, the United Nations mission should be prepared to use military force to restore peace; as was done by the Indian led forces in the Congo in the early 1960s (ONUC). To enable such operations they should obviously be provided with the resources to do so.
I am also quite clear that in cases where the Government of a member state seeks international assistance to deal with internal rebellion or insurgency, or in failed or failing state scenarios, or where genocide is taking place, or there is a humanitarian situation that calls for action, and where the United Nations Security Council determines that intervention is essential, multi-national stabilisation operations mandated by the UN Security Council need to be launched.
The aspect that merits emphasis here is that these operations are required to be undertaken under Chapter VII and hence need to be multi-national combat operations under a lead nation or regional organisation. They should NOT be United Nations “blue-helmeted” peacekeeping operations.
Institutional arrangements for training of peacekeepers
It is with great pride I apprise you of the fact that in order to build on our expertise and experience in this arena, I was able, as Director United Service Institution of India, to set up a Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in September 2000 with support from the Ministry of External Affairs (through my old friend and IMA colleague Jaswant Singh who was then the Foreign Minister, and the then JS UN Dinkar Srivastava), and my Armed Forces colleagues.
The CUNPK besides overseeing the training of contingents earmarked for peacekeeping operations, undertakes conduct of training courses for our sub-unit commanders, military observers, and officers earmarked for deputation on staff appointments.
It is a measure of India’s commitment to the UN, that a minimum of fifteen vacancies on each of the international courses we run, are offered to developing countries, with all expenses incurred on travel from home country and back, training, accommodation and meals, borne by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. A number of developed countries like the USA, UK, Australia, Japan. Norway, Singapore, etc also subscribe to these courses on a self-financing arrangement.
I am therefore of the view that in context of ready availability of forces for United Nations peace operations, the only real answer for meeting crisis situations that call for speedy deployment of military forces, civilian police, and some civil affairs and humanitarian aid personnel for the maintenance of international peace and security within days, if not hours, of a UN Security Council decision, is to raise and maintain a Standing United Nations Rapid Deployment Force of appropriate dimensions.
It is indeed a matter of great satisfaction that, in the last twenty years, the CUNPK has established itself internationally as a Centre of Excellence, and is now regularly called upon to conduct specialised international courses on behalf of UN DPKO.
Besides this of course, the CUNPK had, for a number of years, taken on board from the Pearson Centre for UN Peacekeeping, the responsibility of providing the Secretariat back-stopping of the International Association for Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC).
Imperative need for a standing rapid response United Nations capability
There are many changes that need to be addressed in order to meet the emerging challenges of United Nations peacekeeping; particularly in regard to the compelling mandate for the ‘protection of innocent civilians, including women and children’. These are already under discussion at various forums. I would like to conclude by flagging one specific issue for discussion in the context of the perennial delay in provision of forces and equipment resources for a mission after a decision is taken by the UN Sec Co.
There is little need to dwell at any great length on the point that a military force of modest dimensions (together with police and other civil affairs and humanitarian aid personnel where necessary) inserted into a conflict zone as soon as some semblance of agreement between belligerents is negotiated, can achieve much more in terms of implementation of the terms of the agreement, than a much larger force introduced two to three months later.
Given the fact that during such delay, the political situation within the mission area can change dramatically, hostilities could well have resumed, and the ground situation so much changed as to reduce the chances of peaceful resolution. If this is so clearly evident, it would appear that reservations about having a suitably organised, structured and equipped force that is readily available to the UN when required are somewhat misplaced.
Whereas this idea has been mooted in the past on several occasions including by veteran peacekeepers like former Under Secretary-General in charge of peacekeeping, Sir Brian Urquhart, and there is general agreement to the concept in principle, a point often made in New York by those who do not lend their support to such a proposal is that it is unlikely to receive the endorsement of member states of the United Nations on grounds of costs of establishing and supporting such a force, as also on grounds of political acceptance of the idea.
To the objective analyst these postulations seem quite unconvincing. In my view, reluctance to endorse such a concept particularly by the more powerful countries of the developed world, is primarily because they would not like to see their own influence and ability to manipulate events, diluted by the provision of such ready capability to the United Nations. To that extent, much of the talk about strengthening the United Nations and making it more effective is largely rhetoric.
The point is probably underscored by the increasing reluctance of the developed world over the last few years to provide military personnel and equipment for United Nations peacekeeping operations particularly in difficult missions in Africa. Governments of developed countries of the Western world seem to prefer making available their well-equipped and trained forces to NATO or EU sponsored interventions even in missions outside their area of operations, to complement UN peacekeeping operations rather than being part of such operations.
I am therefore of the view that in context of ready availability of forces for United Nations peace operations, the only real answer for meeting crisis situations that call for speedy deployment of military forces, civilian police, and some civil affairs and humanitarian aid personnel for the maintenance of international peace and security within days, if not hours, of a UN Security Council decision, is to raise and maintain a Standing United Nations Rapid Deployment Force of appropriate dimensions.
Manned by selected volunteers in the various categories, suitably equipped and trained under the aegis of the UN, and positioned at an appropriate location, possibly in Africa. Such a force or elements of it, deployed for a mission should be replaced as soon as feasible by forces deployed under current arrangements and pulled back into reserve status.
For redeployment again or for providing immediate reinforcements to existing missions should the necessity arise. Such volunteers must be on a fixed non-extendable tenure of two to three years; to be replaced by fresh volunteers on a staggered arrangement. They should not be allowed to become ‘indispensable’ gladiators, as much of the current UN secretarial staff consider themselves to be.
