Kargil Vijay Diwas is commemorated every year on 26 July to pay homage to the sacrifice and valour of the Indian Armed Forces, who in 1999, against impossible odds, evicted the Pakistani army from the high mountains to which they had infiltrated—a feat which many thought was impossible to execute. In this war fought in high altitude terrain, 527 brave soldiers of the Indian Armed Forces made the supreme sacrifice while 1363 were wounded.
India was once again surprised and the first information about Pakistani army personnel intruding into the area came not from military patrols or from intelligence sources but from a 36 year old shepherd, Tashi Namgyal who had gone up into the mountains in search of his missing Yak. He belonged to village Gharkon, near the Batalik town, which is about 60 km from Kargil. The date was 3 May 1999. While walking with his friend in search of the Yak on the Jubbar Langpa stream, he took out his binoculars to scan the mountains and what he saw amazed him. On the mountain top were groups of men in Pathan attire, digging bunkers. Some of the men he saw were armed.
Seeing the way the men were dressed, he knew that they had come from across the Line of Control in POJK. leaving the search for his Yak for some other time, Tashi Namgyal came down and promptly informed the nearest post of the Indian Army. Once alerted, the Army got into action and found that the information given by Tashi Namgyal was indeed correct. And so preparations started to evict the infiltrators, who were actually men from the Pakistan military—the Northern Light Infantry, dressed as infiltrators. The Indian Army operation to evict the invaders was code-named Operation Vijay. And, just short of three months later, the operation ended on 26 July 1999, with a total Indian Victory.
Kargil, early signs
While information about the infiltrators became known to the Indian Army only in May 1999, the Pakistani operation to capture the heights of Kargil had started much earlier. The Pakistani plan was called Operation Koh Paima (Koh Paima means the one who climbs mountains) and it was conceived soon after General Pervez Musharraf was appointed the Pakistan Army Chief on 06 October 1998.
The plan was formulated in complete secrecy, with only four people being involved in the planning process. Besides General Musharraf, there was his Chief of General Staff, Lt Gen Aziz Khan and the 10 Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed. The fourth officer was MajGen Javed Hassan, who was made the force commander for Operation KP.
The plan involved occupying the heights around Kargil to cut off National Highway 1 (NH1) to Leh. Musharraf wanted to act quickly before India became too big for Pakistan. Pakistan thought that India would not escalate the issue as Pakistan had the nuclear shield. Strangely, Pakistan did not consider a defensive plan for holding on to the heights they occupied because they thought that the heights were so commanding that Indian troops would not be able to capture them.
They also thought that international pressure would prevent India from fighting back. They thus launched their forces without artillery and logistic support. Unfortunately for Pakistan, all their assumptions proved to be wrong.
This was the time when peace talks between India and Pakistan were making great headway. India’s Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee was scheduled to visit Lahore by bus in February 1999, but even so, the Pakistan military carried on with its preparations to occupy the heights in the Kargil Sector. This in effect meant occupying the heights around the Mushkoh Valley, Dras, Kargil, Batalik and Turtuk.
That epochal visit of India’s Prime Minister took place on 19 February 1999 and at Lahore, Mr Vajpayee made his historic speech where he said…
“Hum jung na hone denge … Teen bar lad chuke ladayi, kitna mehnga sauda… Hum jung na hone denge…”
But even as these famous words for peace were reverberating across the power corridors of the world, Pakistani troops of its Northern Light Infantry, in the guise of infiltrators, were already across the Line of Control, and had occupied some of the heights. They would continue their build up in the next two months in the mountain ranges overlooking the Dras Valley, Kargil and Batalik townships and the village of Turtuk, one of the northernmost villages of Ladakh. The aerial distance between Dras and Turtuk is just over a 100 kilometres and it was on these mouton tops that all the major battles of the Kargil war were fought.
Even as Vajpayee Ji’s famous words for peace were reverberating across the power corridors of the world, Pakistani troops of its Northern Light Infantry, in the guise of infiltrators, were already across the Line of Control, and had occupied some of the heights.
From Sonamarg, as we cross the Zojila Pass on the road to Leh, we enter the Dras and Mushkoh Valleys. This is perhaps one of the coldest inhabited places in the world, due to its wind chill factor. Many of the famous battles like the battle of Tololing, Tiger Hill, Batra Top and others were fought here during the 1999 Kargil War.
The Batalik sub-sector too saw some of the fiercest battles of the conflict, but these were at that time not covered in great detail because the press was not allowed to go to Batalik. According to Brigadier Devender Singh, the former commander of the Batalik Brigade, the battles fought in the Batalik sector were as tough if not tougher than the battles in Dras and Mushkoh Valleys. Here, the attacking troops had to march for three days from the road, just to reach the area of engagement and then launch the assault.
The enemy in this sector had made deeper inroads over a wider area, which meant that there were many more heights to be conquered, and that too with fewer resources. And while Tololing and Tiger Hill are rightly classified as great battles won by India, we must not forget the battles of Khalubar, Jubar and Kukarthang which were fought in Batalik sector, over heights which ranged between 16,000 to 18,000 feet and which were equally great battles won by the Indian Army.
Before the war started, there was only one brigade comprising of three infantry battalions which was responsible to guard the sector between the Zojila Pass and Leh along the LoC – a stretch of about 300 km. The deployment hence was very thin as the terrain was very difficult and the need was not felt for more troops. The Indian posts along the LoC were evacuated before winter set in and the Pakistanis did likewise on their side of the LoC. The mountain heights here ranged between 14000 feet to 18000 feet and the heavy winter snowfall cut them off from the rest of the world.
The enemy in this sector had made deeper inroads over a wider area, which meant that there were many more heights to be conquered, and that too with fewer resources.
The Pakistan Army exploited the virtual lack of Indian military presence in these snow swept mountains during winter and intruded into Mushkoh, Dras, Kargil, Batalik and Turtuk sub-sectors, between Zojila and Leh. After crossing the LoC they made an ingress which varied between 4-10 km and occupied many upheld heights as well as some of the winter vacated Indian posts. The Pakistani aim was to cut off the highway connecting Srinagar with Leh, thereby cutting off Ladakh and Siachen –– a move India didn’t expect.
In the very early stages of the war, A six man patrol led by Capt Saurabh Kalia in the Kaksar sector to determine the whereabouts of the enemy, was ambushed and the officer was brutally tortured and killed. The officer, with his handful of men fought bravely till his ammunition ran out. Over a period of time, from the middle of May onwards, additional troops were inducted into the area and operations began in earnest to evict the Pakistanis from the positions they had occupied.
Remembering the bravehearts
Kargil was a battle fought at the platoon, company and battalion levels, with outstanding leadership being displayed by the battalion and company commanders and by the junior leaders and men. It was here that Capt Vikram Batra displayed exceptional heroism for which he was awarded India’s highest battlefield honour, the Param Vir Chakra.
His famous quote, ‘Yeh Dil Mange More,’ after he had captured one of the objectives was an expression of passion, grit and determination, to evict the enemy from the places he had occupied surreptitiously. It was a commitment to continue the battle till the very last enemy soldier was evicted from the sacred soil of India. He was Killed in Action (KIA) in his next operation, where the enemy was holding on very strongly, but Capt Batra’s courage and indomitable will ensured the position was captured before he succumbed to his injuries.
And who can forget the courage and grit of young Manoj Pande who fought in the Batalik Sector? He led his platoon in the capture of Jubar Top and destroyed bunker after bunker till he was hit by machine-gun fire and succumbed to his injuries. He was yet again another worthy winner of the Param Vir Chakra. In his personal diary, he had written: ‘if death strikes me before I prove my blood, I swear I will kill death’. Such words from one so young makes us all proud to be Indians.
The stories of valour are galore. Rifleman Sanjay Kumar and Grenadier Yogendra Singh Yadav became living legends by their exploits in battle and both went on to win the Param Vir Chakra. Then we have the heroism of Capt Vijyant Thapar, who was awarded the Vir Chakra.
The stories of valour are galore. Rifleman Sanjay Kumar and Grenadier Yogendra Singh Yadav became living legends by their exploits in battle and both went on to win the Param Vir Chakra. Then we have the heroism of Capt Vijyant Thapar, who was awarded the Vir Chakra.
Before going on his last mission, he wrote a letter to his parents. “By the time you get this letter, I’ll be in heaven observing you all from the sky, enjoying the hospitality of Asparas” he wrote. “If I become a human again, I’ll join the army and fight for my nation”. These were very touching words, but there was more to come. Even in these trying and testing times, Young Vijyant remembered a poor orphan girl, Rukhsana, whom he was helping. In his letter, he asks his parents to continue to support that little girl.
What better example of humanity can one give than this, that even in the midst of the greatest danger, Vijyant remembered to help a poor orphan girl whose parents had been killed by militants.
The stories of valour and heroism which flowed from the Kargil War are endless. If Bollywood were to make movies out of these exploits, every single movie would be a super hit. These young men were brave beyond compare and steadfast beyond the call of duty. What more can any nation ask from its youth?
While the Infantry moved foot by bloody foot, to capture the heights, they were helped in no small measure by the Artillery. The Bofors guns proved their worth in gold, and enabled the infantry to capture their objectives by raining down hundreds of thousands of rounds on to the enemy positions.
Approximately 5000 artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired daily from 300 guns, mortars and multi barrel rocket launchers, every day in the Kargil War, and this changed the tide of the battle. And on the day Tiger Hill was reclaimed, 9000 shells were fired. The Gunners indeed displayed remarkable grit and courage, especially all the Forward Observation Officers (FOOs), who were at all times with the leading assault elements of the Infantry.
The role of Air Power in battle can also never be under estimated. The decision to use air power was taken on 25 May. Never before in military history had an air force engaged ground targets at heights as high as the mountain peaks of Kargil. It must be remembered that the IAF had never exercised in such terrain before and now they were being asked to undertake extremely dangerous missions at these high altitudes as the enemy had Stinger Missiles. As the missiles had an operational ceiling of 28,000 feet, the fighter aircraft perforce had to fly at 30,000 feet, and that too along the LoC as the orders were clear that the LoC would not be crossed.
By the first week of June, the Mirage 2000 aircraft with its precision-guided munitions joined the MiG 21s and MiG 23s in the attack, using 1000 pound bombs fitted with laser designators. They effectively disrupted the enemy’s supply columns, blasted their defences, and provided valuable intelligence through reconnaissance sorties. About 6,500 air sorties were flown off which the fighters flew about 1200 sorties of which 650 sorties were attack missions. This was truly an incredible feat in the high altitudes and besides causing severe damage to the enemy, they uplifted the morale of their own troops and destroyed the morale of the enemy.
Ultimately, every single soldier and airman contributed to this great victory, which initially looked as being impossible to achieve. It was the courage and grit of the Indian soldier which made the impossible possible.
Lessons learnt from the Kargil war
There were many lessons which emerged from the Kargil War. Most of these have been highlighted in the Report of the Group of Ministers which was formed to look into the recommendations given in the Kargil Review Committee Report. Here, I will touch upon just seven lessons which we need to consider and seriously ponder over.
Blind Trust can be Fatal
An important learning from the Kargil War is that blind trust can be fatal. Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee went on a peace mission and took a bus to Lahore. But at the very moment, he was speaking of peace, the Pakistan Army was sending its soldiers to occupy the vacant heights in the Kargil Sector. It is true that we must make efforts to build better relations with others, including our enemies, but that does not mean closing our eyes to potential dangers which the enemy may lure us into. Sometimes, when we trust too much, complacency sets in.
An important learning from the Kargil War is that blind trust can be fatal.
Just because the Prime Minister had made a bid for peace, was no reason to believe that peace would be achieved. After all, India has been living with the Pakistani problem for decades and it was unlikely that a single visit could have changed Pakistani mindsets. Eternal vigilance is the price that has to be paid if we want peace on our borders and that is a lesson we all must learn.
Expect the unexpected
The second lesson pertains to the need to anticipate unlikely events, even if the probability of occurrence is very low. Prior to the Kargil infiltration, the Indian Army had carried out an exercise and war gamed the possibility of Pakistan carrying out such an action. It was considered that while such an action was possible, Pakistan would be foolish to carry out such an exercise as maintenance of troops in the mountains would be difficult and while Pakistan may achieve short term tactical success, it was bound to result in a strategic disaster. The assessment hence was that Pakistan will not undertake such a venture with all its attendant risks and the very high probability of failure.
While the assessment was logical, it did not take into account the fact that the enemy’s action do not necessarily have to be logical. And it would have been prudent to at least cater for such an unlikely event. That means, in the winter months, on all clear days when helicopters could fly, the area should have been kept under continuous surveillance and the area should also have been patrolled more frequently. That would have enabled early detection. It is unwise to confuse the improbable with the impossible. We need to remember that human stupidity is capable of anything.
The worst case scenario
The third lesson is the need to prepare for the worst case scenario. When the Kargil war started, both the Army and the Air Force were short of vital ammunition and other items. That is what prompted the then Army Chief to say that we will fight with what we have. A bit of forethought and planning at the level of Ministry of Defence could have averted such a scenario form occurring. A reasonable amount of critical munitions, spares and equipment, which take a long time to procure must hence always be kept as reserve stock, to cater for such an eventuality.
Intelligence failure
The aspect of intelligence failure was once again highlighted in the Kargil War. We were caught by surprise at the very scale of the operations launched by Pakistan. The induction of such a large force would have required months of preparations and activity of such a nature in Gilgit-Baltistan should have been picked up by our intelligence agencies. The failure to do so proved to be very costly. It must be remembered that any action by the enemy requires heightened activity in peacetime and it is important to pick up those signals. This is a vital part of Intelligence gathering which gives us inputs about the enemy’s likely course of action.
Unity of effort
The fifth lesson which comes out of Kargil is the need for unity of effort. This implies total synergy within the Armed Forces, between the Armed Forces and all concerned government agencies, and within the nation as a whole to include each and every organisation and each and every citizen. It is not just the armies which go to war, but the whole nation which goes to war, so a united effort is essential to prosecute and win wars.
There were certain weaknesses in this regard which were highlighted by the Kargil Review Committee, and many of them have now been addressed. An important reform made recently by the government is the appointment of the CDS, a step which was long overdue. The announcement to this effect was made by the Prime Minister in his Independence Day Speech last August and we have now seen one of the most vital defence reforms coming through. The next step will be making the country self-sufficient for most of its defence needs. Work towards that end is being carried out, but much more need to be done to make India truly self-sufficient in most of its defence needs.
Exploiting the media
Today is the information age and the media plays a vital role in war. The Indian media played an excellent role during the Kargil conflict and this was commented upon even by the Pakistanis who felt let down by their own media. The importance of having a free media is vital and we in India are fortunate to have a very strong and free media network.
The seventh lesson: Do not assume
There is an important seventh lesson which we can also learn from the enemy’s actions. The Pakistani planners made a lot of assumptions about what the Indian reaction would be. All these assumptions turned out to be false. The Pakistanis did not cater for an alternate plan, nor did they prepare for a contingency where the Indian reaction would be swift and brutal and where India would not be cowed down either by world opinion or by Pakistani nuclear blackmail. Nawaz Sharif was given a preliminary briefing of the operation, sometime in early February 1999 in Skardo, a few days prior to the visit of India’s Prime Minister to Lahore.
He could have given certain directives to the Army, but he did not do so. Later, on 17 May, when he came to know that Pakistani regular forces were inside Indian territory across the LoC, he again chose to keep quiet, perhaps assuming that things would not spiral out of control. This blindness in both the Pakistan Army and its political establishment is astounding.
On the other hand, when the Pakistan Air Force officers were briefed about the operations in mid-May, it was Air Commodore Abid Rao who prophetically quipped, ‘after this Operation, it is going to be Martial Law or Court Martial’. In the event, it was Martial Law. The Seventh and Final Lesson which we all must imbibe is that plans must be based on reality and not on assumptions.
Conclusion
India has come a long way from what we were in 1999, but there is still a great deal of work ahead of us to see that our nation is secure. The strength of a country depends on the strength of its people, the strength of its economy and the strength of its Armed Forces. Eternal vigilance is the price we have to pay to preserve our freedom and our way of life.
