The Russia-Ukraine war has highlighted the salience of the God of War—the Artillery. Data from the Ukraine conflict of 2014 showed that artillery was producing approximately 85% of all casualties on both sides(i). In the ongoing protracted conflict since 2022, attrition by gunners has again propelled the Russian military’s thought process of waging war. Challenged by multiple layers of ground friction, the intended Ukrainian counter offensive in 2023 made little breakthrough as Russia’s massed fires, during these attempts, degraded them substantially. Extended tactical battles like those seen at Bakhmut and Avdiivka have showcased the neutralisation and destruction of enemy forces by firepower elements. What gains attention is the role and employment expected from artillery units in land warfare.
The utility of firepower by land forces involves many essential aspects. To begin with, own troops mainly engage targets at a tactical and operational depth vital to the success of their combat operations. Till now, armies have traditionally used bulk field artillery calibres of the 105 mm and 122 mm variety, which enable close-in fire support for attack or defence. With 130 mm and 155 mm shells, the volume of explosive content increases, and so does the lateral and longitudinal dispersion when firing at longer ranges. The round travels greater distances and is more affected by prevalent meteorological conditions. The variety offers the defender deployment opportunities relatively in-depth and helps interdict enemy concentrations in earlier timeframes, thereby isolating the battlefield and improving force ratios in the battle.
Precision munitions, on the other hand, cause lethal damage to the target accurately with minimum collateral damage. Their Circular Error of Probability (CEP) is less, so fewer rounds can effectively destroy the target. This needs to be aided by onboard satellite and inertial navigation sensors. The logistics involved are more manageable, and the weapon system can often be deployed in greater depth, improving safety indices. Intrinsic availability with the land forces helps provide much-needed capability when aerial delivery systems meet weather or mission constraints. A report has confirmed India’s purchase of Excalibur rounds for 155 mm guns(ii).
In October 2023, reports surfaced of the use of the US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) in the Ukraine War. This artillery weapon system, capable of a precision strike of up to 300 km, apparently targeted a couple of airfields(iii) under Russian control. Striking accurately on a critical target deep into territory held by an adversary often makes the latter rework its operations or divert necessary resources and efforts to protect its critical assets.
Precision munitions come at a considerable cost. The average current cost of Excalibur is 98.7-106.4 thousand dollars (approx. 83 lakh INR) per projectile.(iv) Therefore, such a mission’s target(s) must be selected carefully and be strategically oroperationally relevant. These targets invariably comprise select command and control centres, communication complexes, armour concentrations, and ammunition dumps that could result in strategic and operational gains.
One prerequisite for the effectiveness of artillery, massed or precision, remains the design of the Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) firing architecture available to the gunners for executing the assigned mission. The ISR efforts involve satellites, UAVs, aircraft, forward (human) observers, electronic, signal, and cyber intelligence. All this has to be fused through a network of sensors and systems to a decision-making node at the appropriate level to utilise firepower effectively and efficiently.
Artillery Batteries capable of firing precision munitions must deploy just in time, be quite in-depth, well camouflaged, and scoot as soon as possible after the mission. Modern gun control systems incorporate ballistic computers, muzzle velocity corrections, and automatic laying and loading mechanisms linked to hubs controlling or directing fire. Further, the enemy’s radars and electronic warfare elements must be neutralised throughout the trajectory to the target.
The Indian Artillery has initiated a procurement process for terminally guided munitions, which will encourage indigenous defence production(v). Other options to improve shell accuracy include fitting course correction fuses, such as the one being developed by the DRDO(vi). At the lower end of range and lethality can be loitering munitions for artillery units that can offer variety at the tactical level(vii).
An important aspect is the interweave of artillery with other arms that hold ground or manoeuvre to gain combat advantage over the foe. Infantry and armour, mechanised forces, aviation assets with communication, EW, combat engineers and now drones must combine closely with the artillery at the tactical level for optimum results. For all this, it is essential to have a common operational doctrine and an agile organisation, devise suitable tactics, and utilise robust training opportunities to practise combat against the adversary. In addition, one must strive to integrate firepower assets with the Air Force and Navy in joint missions.
The effectiveness of artillery systems will depend on how much firepower assets are integrated, the balance between munitions utilised for massed and precision fire(s), likely expenditure patterns in combat, and the inventories held. Seamless sensor-to-shooter links, reliable and secure communications, and system redundancy will all become a sine qua non for success on the battlefield. The war in Ukraine is witnessing a lot of innovation. “Geographical Information System (GIS) Arta uses an algorithm to optimise across variables like target type, position, and range to assign ‘fire missions’ to available artillery units. Users connect to GIS Arta using phones, laptops, and tablets connected to military radios, cellphones, or the Starlink satellite internet system”(viii).
Artillery Batteries capable of firing precision munitions must deploy just in time, be quite in-depth, well camouflaged, and scoot as soon as possible after the mission. Modern gun control systems incorporate ballistic computers, muzzle velocity corrections, and automatic laying and loading mechanisms linked to hubs controlling or directing fire. Further, the enemy’s radars and electronic warfare elements must be neutralised throughout the trajectory to the target.
Further, it would be imperative to strengthen counter-bombardment (CB) endeavours by dedicating weapon-locating radars and guns or mortars to minimise attrition to own artillery pieces. This is demanded due to the artillery deployment experience in the Ukraine war. “These (Zoopark-1M) radars crunch numbers fast. The technology has allowed Russian units to hammer Ukrainian artillery positions just four minutes after they fire an opening shot”.(ix) This implies a detailed selection of spaces for deploying and redeployment of units and formations.
While any nation can start a war, its duration and intensity become indeterminate in the long run. “Officials say Russia is currently firing around 10,000 shells a day, compared to just 2,000 a day from the Ukrainian side.”(x) To enable this, war planners must cater for a surge in ammunition production capacities and complex supply chain management.
Are kinetic effects alone enough to make the necessary impact in modern warfare? Not necessarily. Non-lethal efforts incorporating deception, social media, and offensive or defensive EW measures as force multipliers are also needed.
In the future, Commanders, campaign planners, and the General Staff will have to consider the pivotal role of artillery in battle at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. They would need to look at its principles of employment, such as concentration, flexibility, economy of effort, and the aspects of surprise and coordination, much more closely. The necessity of firepower across the frontier will also be ubiquitous over a wide front and for battles well into the depth.
Thus, much work remains, which begins with an operational review of the present gaps in the profile and strength of artillery. To enhance our reach and impact, we need to improve the range and lethality of systems by accelerating the ‘mediumisation’ of guns. At the cutting edge, we need to consider artificial intelligence (AI) based image processing and targeting. We must also upgrade clunky artillery tactical computers to secure portable tablets infused with agile GIS software for better battlefield awareness. Further, battle drills and procedures may require a relook to boost the survivability of guns in visualised battlefield conditions.
Warfare is evolving rapidly. Armed Forces worldwide have learned many lessons from recent wars, and many more will accrue. As artillery plays a vital role in deciding the outcome of war, a combined arms approach to its employment and utilisation is the best way ahead.
i Phillip A Karber, The Potomac Foundation, Lessons Learned from the Ukraine War, 08 July 2015 (revised edit 29 Sep 2015), pp 31, accessed at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316122469_Karber_RUS-UKR_War_Lessons_Learned/link/58f1576e458515ff23ab42bc/download?_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InB1YmxpY2F0aW9uIiwicGFnZSI6InB1YmxpY2F0aW9uIn19 on 10 March 2024.
ii Congressional Research Service, In Focus, India-U.S.: Major Arms Transfers and Military Exercises, 14 Dec 2023, accessed at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12438/1 on 11 March 2023.
iii Smruti Deshpande, The Print, What’s ATACMS — a missile that ‘performed brilliantly’ in Desert Storm, now supplied by US to Ukraine, Oct 19, 2023, accessed at https://theprint.in/world/whats-atacms-missile-that-performed-brilliantly-in-desert-storm-now-supplied-by-us-to-ukraine/1810222/ on 09 March 2024.
iv Technology.Org, Ukraine will receive another 1,000 high-precision Excaliburs from the U.S., 17 Sep 2022, accessed at https://www.technology.org/2022/09/17/ ukraine-will-receive-another-1000-high-precision-excaliburs-from-the-u-s/ on 11 March 2023.
v Invitation for Expression of Interest for Procurement of 1966 rounds of 155 mm Terminally Guided Munition (TGM) under Make II category of DAP-2020, 01 Dec 2021, Arty 5, accessed at https://www.makeinindiadefence.gov.in/admin/writereaddata/upload/project/eoi/Final_EoI_TGM_01_Dec_2021.pdf on 14 March 2024.
vi Technology Development Fund, DRDO, Development of Course Correction Fuze for Artillery, accessed at https://tdf.drdo.gov.in/project/development-course-correction-fuze-artillery on 14 March 2024.
vii Timesnownews.com, Indian Army plans to buy Medium Range Precision Kill System with ‘loitering munitions’, 23 Dec 2021, accessed at https://www.timesnownews.com/india/article/indian-army-plans-to-buy-medium-range-precision-kill-system-with-loitering-munitions/842902, on 15 March 2024.
viii David Zikusoka, How Ukraine’s “Uber for Artillery” is Leading the Software War Against Russia, 25 May 2023, accessed at https://www.newamerica.org/future-frontlines/blogs/how-ukraines-uber-for-artillery-is-leading-the-software-war-against-russia/ on 17 March 2024.
ix The Economist, The modern cannons that may make the difference in Ukraine, 15 June 2022, accessed at https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2022/06/15/the-modern-cannons-that-may-make-the-difference-in-ukraine on 16 March 2024.
x Katie Bo Lillis and others, CNN, Exclusive: Russia producing three times more artillery shells than US and Europe for Ukraine 11 March 2024, accessed at https:// edition.cnn.com/2024/03/10/politics/russia-artillery-shell-production-us-europe-ukraine/index.html on 16 March 2024.
