Introduction
As the war in Ukraine has entered its third year, few observers would have imagined that it would still be raging. After the dramatic swings in territorial control during 2022, when the Ukrainian military managed to recapture parts of the Kharkiv region and the city of Kherson, the war settled into a positional and attritional grind in 2023 with both the tempo of operations and the intensity reducing.
The Ukrainian counter offensive failed to deliver substantial territorial gains. The momentum generated by Ukraine’s success in the first year of the conflict has given way to a sense that, despite ongoing fighting, the frontline is not moving, and the risk of a forever frozen conflict is growing.
The US is wrangling over funding, and although most European leaders remain firm in their support for Kyiv, it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to maintain that same level of support among their public. Cost-of-living concerns are leading many Europeans to question the sustainability of continued funding for Ukraine, and the outbreak of war in the Gaza Strip has divided the Wests attention.
The Prevailing Situation
Compared with last year, Ukraine faces two challenges. Militarily, it has been pushed due to the failure of its counter offensive and by sheer force of troops in Russia’s favour. A Ukrainian victory will require strategic endurance and vision as well as the ability to sustain losses.
Apart from this the West—and particularly the US has struggled to provide the military aid Ukraine needs to sustain the fight. Ukraine can’t turn the military tide without more Western military aid, but it has struggled to get more military aid; unless it can demonstrate that it can win on the battlefield. The two key challenges are obvious. The first is how to get more weapons to Ukraine. The second is how Europeans can defend themselves without US backing.
Russia on the other hand is now operating from a position of strength. After the capture of Bakhmut and the creation of the Surovikin Line they spent 2023 consolidating their positions. Coupled with improvements in shortening the time between target detection and the carrying out of battlefield strikes, the Ukrainians faced an adversary in 2023 that was very different from the one it faced in 2022.
To overcome this evolved enemy, Ukraine was forced to adapt its tactics, technology, and operations, in part by sending some troops to Poland and other European countries for additional combined arms training before the counter offensive began. But Kyiv’s efforts were still insufficient to the task of retaking more of the South.
This year the Russians have met with success by capturing Avdiivka. The now-destroyed city carved a bulge in the front line that undermined critical Russian logistical operations. It sits only a few miles from the city of Donetsk, which Russia has occupied since 2014. Its fall allows the Russian military to move troops and equipment more efficiently as it presses in other directions.
There is another chink which has been exposed with the removal of General Zalhuzhny which was the differences regarding the new conscription law that would increase the size of the military. He had proposed mobilizing close to 500,000 troops, a figure President Zelensky viewed as impractical given the scarcity of uniforms, guns and training facilities and the potential challenges related to recruitment.
President Zelensky said publicly that Ukraine lacks the funds to pay so many new conscripts. General Zaluzhny countered that Ukraine is already short of forces because of mounting casualties and needs to match 400,000 new soldiers that Russia plans to mobilize. In an opinion piece for CNN General Zaluzhny wrote about “the inability of state institutions in Ukraine to improve the manpower levels of our Armed Forces without the use of unpopular measures”.
The issue is Ukraine cannot be faced with the prospect of having Western weapons without soldiers to operate them or soldiers without weapons in case the ‘air bubble’ regarding the supply of these weapons is overcome. Both these are disastrous. President Zelensky’s famous response “I need ammunition, not a ride” to a US offer to evacuate him in 2022 holds just as true today. Without a constant stream of military aid, Ukrainian resistance will be very hard to sustain.
Negotiating a Ceasefire
The Ukrainians fear that in case they do settle the issue they would be negotiating from a position of weakness having lost a considerable portion of their land to Russia. The fear that Russia will simply regroup and attack again also remains. But in spite of the hardships being endured the Ukrainians are in no mood to compromise. Even if a third party could get both sides to a negotiating table it is unlikely that the Ukrainian public or the Ukrainian Parliament will accept a permanent loss of territory.
Concessions to domination are simply abhorrent, even for the weak. As the French philosopher Frantz Fanon wrote in his 1961 classic, ‘The Wretched of the Earth’, which provides a psychoanalysis of the dehumanizing effects of colonization upon the individual and the nation; “We revolt simply because, for many reasons, we can no longer breathe.”
Arguably, principles and unacceptable compromises are one of the main reasons for countries to wage long wars The gap between idealists and realists persists. Ukraine needs to overcome its ideological barriers and trade some degree of sovereignty for peace. Converting the present line of contact into the ‘LoC’ seems to be a workable solution to end the conflict.
Are Long Wars here to Stay
The Ukraine War has upended many of the theories of war including one that modern wars will be short and swift. Why is this war dragging on? The fact is that war is the worst way to settle political differences. As the costs of fighting becomes apparent, adversaries usually look for an agreement to end the conflict.
Many wars, of course, do last longer. There are many reasons why compromises fail to take place. These could range from public opinion against a compromise, to leaders thinking that a defeat or an end of a conflict could threaten their own position, when there is a lack of understanding on one’s own strength and that of the enemy as articulated by Sun Tzu many centuries ago, leading to underestimating the damaging consequences of the conflict and when there is a fear of an existential threat. This manifests itself with Russia being uncomfortable with NATO at their doorstep and Ukraine fearing the loss of their sovereignty.
All these factors have kept the war going.
Of course, the above reasons are rooted in a situation where there is not a clash of ideologies such as Communism versus Capitalism and autocracies versus liberal democracies or on religious grounds. Peace is impossible, if ideological barriers prevent negotiations. Such values and ideas will continue to play a leading role in the wars waged in the future. The West has grown more rights-based over time: resulting in their defending certain liberal principles, whatever the consequences.
International Pressure to End Conflicts
The fog of war lifts slowly. Take the current situation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian forces initially exceeded everyone’s expectations by preventing the fall of Kyiv and by their dogged resistance and were even successful in recapturing certain areas but the failure of their much-vaunted counter offensive after being armed with Western weapons has revealed that it is difficult for them to drive Russian troops out of the country.
A European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) survey conducted across twelve EU countries revealed that most Europeans support Ukraine in its war against Russia but only 10% think Ukraine can win.
Most Europeans “are desperate to prevent a Russian victory” but do not believe Kyiv can win militarily”. The report’s authors have argued that, based on these findings, EU politicians should take a more “realistic” approach that centres upon establishing how peace can be achieved. The voices sceptical of the Ukraine’s prospects are growing.
This pessimism about the war’s outcome was being fuelled by Ukraine’s failed counteroffensive, a potential US policy shift and the possibility of Donald Trump getting into the White House. Could a Trump-led US abandon Ukraine in addition to the NATO.
The question that needs to be answered is for how long can Europe sustain the support for Ukraine? A fatigue is setting in as costs grow. Domestic concerns from inflation-led cost-of-living could also make it difficult for governments to spend huge sums on Ukraine.This thought is not new, but is increasingly being echoed and reflects a grim truth.
Countries Need to Be Backed by the Power of a UN Veto
But what has clearly come out from the two present ongoing conflicts is the helplessness of the international community represented by the UNSC when a member of the P 5 or a country which has the backing of the P 5 decides to take matters in its hands. The veto has exposed the core shortcoming in the UN particularly when trying to keep peace.
The system was designed to prevent conflict between states and preserve stability through sovereignty.Yet those who designed the system also gave themselves the trump card the veto power. This has resulted in them dictating international politics in their favour. No wonder Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira stated that; “Multilateral institutions are not properly equipped to deal with the current challenges, as has been demonstrated by the Security Council’s unacceptable paralysis.”
Pakistan today is benefitting from China’s support at various international forums when it comes to blacklisting terrorists. Presently, Israel is benefitting from US support while conducting its offensive in Gaza. While India has benefitted from the veto by USSR in 1971 in the face of the genocide by Pakistan, there is no doubt that we need to ensure the backing of a member of the P5 until UN reforms take place.
Need To Develop and Sustain Hard Power
At its core, war is about power who has it, who doesn’t, and who can effectively use it. The war in Ukraine is no exception. General Manoj Pande the Army Chief has clearly stated;””The current Russia-Ukraine conflict provides some very valuable pointers. The relevance of hard power stands reaffirmed with land continuing to be the decisive domain of warfare and notion of victory still being land centric.” There is no doubt that the instrument of force has returned to the centre of the power calculus.
Countries need to develop hard power as deterrence based on their military capabilities to include weapon systems, training and doctrines backed by the willingness to use their military.
While Long-range precision fires have proved that distances need not necessarily grant or guarantee safety, and air is no longer dominated just by manned aircraft and drones, loiter ammunition, shoulder fired air defence missiles, manned, unmanned systems have democratised the air littoralandtechnology has emerged as a new strategic arena of geo-political competition the fact remains that you need boots on ground.
This has been demonstrated by the tanks which were said to be dead or dying. But they have adapted and are prevailing in the contemporary battle space with increasing inclusivity. To seize and hold ground you need a tank. The war in Ukraine has not revealed anything fundamentally new about the tank. It has confirmed old lessons and reflected the challenges of armoured warfare. The issue of armour getting redundant comes up time and again but immediately thereafter countries clamour for armour as has been witnessed in Ukraine where there was much hype regarding the destruction of Russian tanks but Ukraine was soon clamouring for Chieftains, Leopards and Abrahms to ensure success of their counter offensive.
Since the end of the Cold War and the advent of US-Russian arms control, the threat of nuclear weapons has become less salient. However, there have been threats on use of nuclear weapons threats from Russia. US President Joe Biden also declared the risk of a nuclear armagedd on to be at its highest level for 60 years, bringing the nuclear issue firmly back to the forefront. The issue of nuclear ‘guard rails’ by countries not part of the ‘nuclear club’ will no doubt have ramifications well after the conflict.Are nuclear capabilities the ultimate guarantor of national security?
Hard power also extends to relationships between states that are decisive in shaping conflict outcomes. While power is measured by looking at capabilities, such as military weapons or GDP. However, globalization and changes in technology have made it cheaper and easier for goods, services, and information to flow across borders and advance interconnectedness between countries, relationships such as alliances and trade networks have become as important to any assessment of national power as capability-based measures. Though interdependence can be a double-edged weapon yet, in today’s world, when two states compete, the one with stronger and more robust relationships may retain the upper hand, even in the face of capability imbalances. Hence relationships matter.
Self-Reliance Crucial to Sustaining and Winning Wars
One of the major takeaways is that India needs to wean away from import dependency.While the pursuit to infuse technology in our war fighting system indeed remains an enduring one, the conclusion that we can draw is that self-sufficiency in critical technologies and investment in R&D is an inescapable strategic imperative. The security of nations cannot be outsourced, nor can it be dependent on other nations.
Inadequacies in military – industrial complexes have come to light.As per reports North Korea has transferred more artillery ammunition to Russia than the West has been able to supply Ukraine. Further, the monthly consumption of some munitions is much more than can be produced in a year.
In India’s case the initiatives under ‘atmanirbhar’ have been transformational but a technologically enabled innovation driven, industrial base is a prerequisite to winning wars. However, we need to appreciate since self-reliance demands long term capital and personal investments and is also dependant on the private sector, the government needs to lay down consistent policies and ensure financial commitments.
Conclusion
The war in Ukraine is an example of a fight that grinds on not because of strategic dilemmas alone but because both sides find the idea of termination of the conflict impossible.
The conflict has also established new benchmarks in the ways of modern warfare and demonstrated just how dangerous the world we are living in is. Countries therefore need to remain ‘fighting fit’ which involves building deterrence by developing hard power backed by a strong military industrial base to ensure a fair degree of self-reliance.
It’s an old adage, that wars are world-shaping. Their outcomes are far-reaching: redrawing maps, establishing new fault lines, and ushering unprecedented changes. This war is proving to be no different.
