History of conflict is replete with indiscernible way points that only in-depth study can unravel. But the truism that governs its visible exterior is such that analysis holds its own. India China relationship has had its share of problems an continues to battle them.
Therefore, aspects such as whether Carl von Clausewitz, author of On War was influenced by Sun Tzu, the sixth century Chinese thinker or not has to be unearthed only by the doggedness of examination. But the fact of the matter is that both their works, despite apparent differences in their philosophies pertaining to combat, have certain inherent convergences.
Clausewitz, a Prussian military strategist has written that “(war) has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself”. He also states that “war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself”. Such assertions resonate in Sun Tzu as well, especially when he affirms that “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting”. In other words, victory is better achieved by diplomacy—an important plinth in “political intercourse”—rather than by taking recourse to war.
Old wounds
The history of India-China relations is fraught with a surfeit of mistakes. Indeed, despite attempts by both the countries to bury the past and make a new beginning, indications are that misunderstandings continue to simmer over certain fundamental issues. The unfortunate incident in Galwan in 2020 is the latest. The reasons for the intrusion in Eastern Ladakh according to the author were pure messaging to both the United States as also India’s neighbours.
While it sought to “inform” the United States that India cannot be used as a countervail to its anti-China overtures, Beijing was attempting to caution India’s neighbours that India cannot be relied as a security foil. But the most important reason was to restrict India to its land commitments and away from embarking upon maritime quest, a right which China seeks to be its singular prerogative. It is another matter that it has failed in its endeavour.
China’s moves
Earlier an impasse was witnessed in Doklam. It has an interesting narrative, one which gains in importance when the fact about the Chinese having “informed” New Delhi “in advance” about its plan to build a road in the plateau is factored into. If this information is correct than the conflict that had marked the “conflict” can be said to have been unnecessary.
The point that is being made is that if the Chinese were bent upon constructing a motorable road that would take it right up to the Royal Bhutan Army post at the base of Zampheri Ridge, a course of action that would severely compromise the security of the
tenuous 22 Km Siliguri Corridor which connects the Northeast of India to the rest of India, then expedience should have egged Indian strategists to find a way to circumvent the problem instead of involving itself in both pointless rhetoric and tedious logistical activities such as advanced troop deployment.
The history of India-China relations is fraught with a surfeit of mistakes. Indeed, despite attempts by both the countries to bury the past and make a new beginning, indications are that misunderstandings continue to simmer over certain fundamental issues.
Indeed, if the building of the road by the Chinese—and consequently putting in place sophisticated infrastructure in the “base”—poses a security threat to the “Chicken’s Neck”, the circuitous route that could (and, indeed can still be!) have been adopted was to seek out other “corridors” and routes to the North East, calling, thereby, not only the Chinese bluff, but negating the threat which the road would create.
Such pragmatic acts would not be too demanding an affair in the present times, especially as New Delhi has an able partner in Dhaka. In any event, notwithstanding the fact that both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, too, were military men, the fact of the matter is that rhetoric always takes a front seat in any imbroglio when it can be conveniently avoided.
At any rate, a solution of sorts—with an eye to circuiting the status quo that prevails—was proposed by this author on 26-27 August 2014 during the course of an Indo-China “Track II Dialogue” in which he was a member of the Indian delegation. With the knowledge that neither sides would surrender ground (the instances which were quoted were that of Thagla Ridge held by the Chinese and the Namka Chu River that runs south of the Ridge held by the Indians in the Kameng Sector) as well as the fact that the only solution lies in converting the “Line of Actual Control” into an International Boundary, the author took recourse to semantics.
Fine lines
The phrase “Line of Actual Control”—if even a step is to be taken in the direction of later-day resolution (even by the generation that is to come!)—must be replaced by a classification that does not ring of belligerence. “Line of Amity” is the name that was proposed. If unyieldingness is inevitable and status quo is the only outcome of protracted negotiations, it is the author’s considered opinion that at least a change of nomenclature that resonates of accommodation could herald a positive mindset change from continual and non-progressive status quo.
The name “Line of Amity” also has the distinct possibility of bringing future leaders of both the countries to the table without the baggage of the past as well as the suspicion that has accompanied almost all Indo-China boundary dialogue and could well be the prerequisite for entente cordiale.
The author also laced his plea by stating that altering the name from “Line of Actual Control” to “Line of Amity” would not have any legal implications or bring forth questions about the principle by which delineation of boundaries are normally undertaken. He hazarded this aspect despite the fact that the watershed principle is generally applicable to the Thagla Ridge which the Chinese presently occupies and the “Line of Actual Control” in the sub-sector almost approximates the “Line” which Henry McMahon drew in 1914 during the Simla Conference.
The name “Line of Amity” also has the distinct possibility of bringing future leaders of both the countries to the table without the baggage of the past as well as the suspicion that has accompanied almost all Indo-China boundary dialogue and could well be the prerequisite for entente cordiale.
As Sun Tzu stated in his The Art of War “in the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity” and “opportunities multiply as they are seized”.
