The Indo-Pacific is an emerging area of geo-strategic competition. Characterised by the rise of China, it is forcing countries in the region to choose sides. With a few States aligning with China, and a good number hedging their bets, there are others seeking to counter its rise in the region. This has given rise to competing impulses of rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, with each actor trying to maximize its position in the region.
Strategically speaking, what matters most in the region is the maritime space, spanning the West coast of the Americas to the East coast of Africa. Approximately, 8000×8000 km in geographic spread, this region is home to about 36 countries encompassing two-thirds of the world economy. With recurring skirmishes in the Western Pacific, a repeated show of force to capitulate Taiwan, and aggression in the high Himalayas, the region is witnessing a rapidly changing security environment with increased risks of escalation.
Competing Notions
Two notions dominate the Indo-Pacific debate. First that the Indo-Pacific region is one geo-strategic space, where like-minded countries collaborate to deal with China’s rise and its assertive behaviour. Led by the US, it calls for strong alliances and partnerships to build regional capacity, on matters of trade, technology and interoperability. This has led to strengthening of old and new frameworks, including the QUAD and the AUKUS. While these mechanisms have gained some traction, they do not evoke sufficient mutual trust to allow full acceptance of the idea of the Indo-Pacific region as a cogent and coherent security construct.
Consequentially, there are those who question this trans-oceanic identity. They argue that, the two oceans, while contiguous to each other, are distinct in their strategic orientation. Whether it is their maritime geographies, past histories of conflict, or security contexts, they are different. For instance, the Western Pacific is ridden with military competition, while the Indian Ocean is more pacific. The Pacific Ocean has developed a distinct identity, while the IOR is yet to find an enduring identity for itself. Therefore, the two oceans are distinct strategic spaces and should be dealt with as such.
From a security perspective, these notions give rise to an impression that the Indo-Pacific is a maritime dimension and the prevailing security imperative dictates focussing on the maritime space and that, the land dimension is less relevant. Landforms are important. The fact that, humans live on land, governments act from land, and wars are predominantly fought on and for land, suggests that the land factor is an important driver in the maritime dimension. The question then is, how does the land factor impact our thinking on the maritime dimension and a State’s policy choices on security.
The Continental Context
While this debate is unending, it might be useful to analyse how the land contexts shape the maritime orientation of the States, their political leaders, policy-makers and military practitioners. As a case in point, the history of the maritime security is rooted in countering piracy, illicit fishing, migration, smuggling and blue crimes, whose origins are as a consequence to social dynamics on land. Breakdown in the rules of the sea – like the Nord-stream attack – is an incisive example of land wars spilling over to the maritime domain.
Two factors explain this context. First, the shape and size of the countries dictate their strategic orientation. Whether these States are peninsular, coastal, or landlocked, these contexts demand a 360-degree orientation in terms of security of their land borders, festering internal security issues and the maritime dimension, in that order. The larger the land context, the stronger the propensity to de-prioritise its maritime concerns. For instance, India, Thailand, Vietnam and South Korea, with contested land borders, have little choice but to prioritise their land forces over building their naval capacity.
Secondly, in the case of island territories, while they also demand a 360-degree orientation, their priorities are somewhat different. For countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Australia and Japan faced with sea-based threats, securing their territorial waters, internal waterways, port and allied infrastructure and coastal defence are the key priorities. Such States are likely to prioritise maritime security over the land components. Taiwan is a peculiar case, where its proximity to the Chinese mainland, forces it to adopt a strong coastal and air defence posture over traditional platforms of maritime security.
There is yet another aspect. The land-based military components provide the foundational capabilities of scope and scale much larger than the air or maritime components. The sheer nature of their organising and operating principles enables conduct of large-scale operations to counter the aggression by a powerful adversary like China and be in a position to consolidate gains made by the naval and air forces. Suffice to say that land war-fighting components are central to a State’s capability to deter and defend its vital interests on land and at sea.
It is therefore no surprise that land armies make up nearly 68 per cent of the military forces in the Indo-Pacific. For instance, 85 per cent of India’s armed forces are committed towards its land borders. Indonesia is pegged at 75 per cent, Philippines at 70 per cent and Japan has committed approximately 65 per cent to land war-fighting requirements. Any continental drawdown of land forces can come at a huge cost. As a case in point, India cannot afford to be weak in the Himalayas at the cost of being strong at sea.
India’s Balancing Act
In India’s case, it can be argued that its maritime security is rooted in the continental context. Therefore, India’s maritime security agenda will have to balance out the competing interests on land and at sea. Balancing the two is important and the policy challenge is that they should not come at the cost of each other. More so when, China’s bellicosity towards India along its land borders and in the Indian ocean region is likely to manifest in different time windows.
As of now, India spends 14-17 per cent of its defence budget on its navy, while there is a strong case to build a capable navy, at least for the IOR, if not for the whole of the Indo-Pacific region. The question of patrolling the near or far seas, or our and their oceans, arises out of these policy and budgeting dilemmas. In any case, the Indo-Pacific is `Pacific-heavy`, where the possibility of India being prodded into a confrontation with China is high and best avoided.
Three aspects are pertinent. First, it is important to ascertain as to how large and wide India’s oceanic identity and interests are in the region. Do they weigh more westwards towards the Gulf region, or eastwards towards the Malacca, and to what extent into the Pacific Ocean? This will help us frame our maritime security agenda more precisely, rather than trying to be all over the Indo-Pacific region.
Next, how does the Indian State break away from its continental outlook to a maritime context? Would that be feasible in the near future? How can we create the policy environment to prioritise the maritime contexts in the future? This might well not be possible until China and India find a satisfactory mechanism to settle the border. And finally, India will have to tailor its strengths and vulnerabilities at sea, without over-polarising the oceanic space it aspires to secure. The acute congestion of military actors in the Western Pacific, resulting in frequent skirmishes at sea, is an instructive case in point.
Suffice to say that getting swayed by extra-regional partners is tempting but not prudent given our tight military capacities and associated economics. With just consolidating what is our primary area of influence/interest in the Indian ocean region, it might make more sense.
Lieutenant General Harinder Singh PVSM, AVSM, YSM, SM, VSM, (Retd) commanded 14 Corps during the Galwan stand off and retired as the Commandant of the Indian Miliatry Academy. He has also been the Directore General of Military Intelligence. He commanded a Division in North Kashmir and has led the UN Multi-National Brigade in Eastern Congo. He is a prolific and deeply respected writer on matters of defence- and security strategy.
