While the purists are still in denial, not only does Cold War 2.0 seem to be intensifying, it is well nigh possible that the two principal protagonists may come to a military head. What makes matters particularly volatile is the fact that unlike in the preceding version, in this edition of the Cold War, the two protagonists are technological and economic near peers, even though in the military domain the Americans, perhaps, still steal a march.
It does seem that while China’s reservoir of power is growing, the American reservoir is declining. American strategic influence is no longer decisive. Two metrics undergird the reality: By 2035, while the Chinese economy will account for 24 per cent of global GDP, the American economy will account for a mere 14 per cent; the PLA has grown 44-fold since 1995, to include a sharp digital makeover.
The many signs from China
While there are several reasons to infer that China’s problems may not be over — they may in fact be growing (a slowing economy, the zero Covid policy, killing of the animal spirits in technology and business, the common prosperity programme, the real estate crisis, adverse demographics) — there are other indicators to suggest that Beijing believes it has arrived and is now strong enough to contest American primacy, at least in its near abroad in the Western Pacific. More than anytime in the past, we may be in for a high-order hegemonic contest in Asia that could lead to war.
The Chinese also never fail to point out that if the Americans can have a Western Hemisphere of their own strategic making, why can’t there be an Eastern Hemisphere in the Chinese mould? So “legitimate territories” in the Chinese sphere of influence must be got back.
A certain power elite in China is of the view that the time has come for Beijing to convert its considerable wealth into great powerhood. Hide and bide, after all, cannot be a perpetual state. There is also a chronological logic of sorts to China’s going loud and proud: Mao Zedong gave China the revolution, Deng Xiaoping gave them wealth, and it is axiomatic now for Xi Jinping to restore greatness.
The Chinese also never fail to point out that if the Americans can have a Western Hemisphere of their own strategic making, why can’t there be an Eastern Hemisphere in the Chinese mould? So “legitimate territories” in the Chinese sphere of influence must be got back.
Other nations in the Eastern Hemisphere must acknowledge the reality of the new power hierarchy and offer tributes to the new hegemon. Xi and his cohorts also sense a unique moment in history that must not be lost — hence, the repeated references to the phrase “great changes not seen in a century”, pointing to a time of great opportunity for the Chinese nation in view of unprecedented technological and geopolitical shifts.
The world around
Deep down, the Americans realise, perhaps, that they were laggardly in waking up to the Chinese genie and that it is now a trifle late to put it back into the bottle.
Compromise is also difficult because both sides firmly believe in the superiority of their respective political brands and are unwilling to give in — Western freedom and values versus a unique (Chinese) civilisation whose delivery in terms of poverty alleviation and other indices of development has been quite extraordinary. That should explain the recent ideological reassertion in the Chinese political calculus. China and America also know that in the ultimate analysis, if you have the power your values rule; if you don’t, you submit.
There are growing voices in the strategic commentariat of nations that are allies/partners of the US, that the protection of the American military umbrella may no longer be available or dependable.
Many nations in the region do not wish to choose between the US and China. Others are bandying the argument that prudence lies in accepting the new reality of Chinese power. There are growing voices in the strategic commentariat of nations that are allies/partners of the US, that the protection of the American military umbrella may no longer be available or dependable.
That distant NATO has begun to see China as a challenge is an acknowledgement of the new reality. The point of emphasis is that Chinese assertiveness is not a piece of indiscrete jingoism but predicated on a clear-headed realisation of the power shift, a deep-seated ideological belief and is, therefore, very real. These are early days, but a possible modus vivendi in the Sino-American contest may lie in a division of mutually exclusive spheres of influence at some point in the future.
Indian side
The Indian strategic dilemma is acute. The Chinese view of our autonomy is not universally respectful: Some scholars like Liu Zongyi think of India as a nation that is watching the fun from atop a hill, even as two tigers fight. No matter how earnestly we try to navigate the Sino-American contest, no matter how canny our statecraft, we will get ensnared in the developing hardball. The great power in waiting that India is, it cannot partake in China’s tributary state view of the world. Also, in a prospective fight between the two tigers, America is unlikely to win.
The choices before India, therefore, are not only limited but pretty stark. If China is indeed tottering at the seams, we should use the geo-strategic reprieve available to close in on the power gap; if it is not, we need to brace up to the challenge with far greater immediacy.
The surest way will be to strengthen our strategic-military play by an order of magnitude: Enhance deterrence in the traditional and emerging domains as also transit rapidly from a military focussed on India’s defence to one that is also sophisticated enough to sustain its rise. Since that will take a while, we may like to figure out ways and means of learning to live with Chinese power and make strategic adjustments accordingly. At the very least, we should not sleepwalk into conflict and war.
-This story earlier appeared on www.theindiaexpress.com
