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 For
how long can we continue to rely on imported arms? If India has to
play any meaningful role in global affairs, it will have to uplift its
indigenous capabilities to meet its defence requirements
Last month, the media seemed to have rediscovered the value inherent
in stories related to the armed forces. 26th July 2009 was surely a
red letter day in military-media relations. The private media channels
defied the government’s tacit neglect of the 10th anniversary of the
Kargil War and covered the events live from Dras. They also accorded
due cognisance to the launch of INS Arihant, the indigenously built
nuclear submarine. Did the live coverage of the Kargil War anniversary
happen by design or default? Let’s leave the TV channels to deliberate
on their commitment to the protectors of the nation. However, what is
of prime importance is that the nation did get a glimpse of the
sacrifices of the Indian Army in protecting our borders.
Simultaneously, there was much lamenting by the
media about the paucity of equipment, guns, aircraft, ships and
submarines in the Indian war inventory - all very repetitive,
generating a sense of déjà vu. The usual stuff - the Bofors syndrome
has precluded us from acquiring an arty gun for more than two decades
now - the normal diatribe against the DRDO for moving at a snail’s
pace - and the most fashionable argument to enhance the speed of
defence imports is of course, the China factor. However, what
journalists or defence analysts are shy to ask is - despite being the
biggest importer of arms in the world, why is Indian defence still not
up to the mark? Is there something wrong with our perspective
planning? Or is it just our penchant for foreign goods? Or more
importantly, are the equipment imports linked to foreign policy?
The Defence Minister, Mr AK Antony has made a
beginning by admitting in the Lok Shaba, “We had set up the goal of
self-reliance some 50 years ago. But still, it is unfortunate that we
are importing 70 per cent of our defence equipment. We cannot allow
this to happen. It is both shameful and dangerous.”
Why do we highlight the failures of DRDO yet the
performance of imported equipment always remains shrouded under the
garb of secrecy? And even if news about the foreign equipment’s below
par performance does trickle down, attention is diverted towards
financial irregularity. Notwithstanding that the Bofors gun did prove
its efficacy in Kargil, and the Soviet missile boats proved their
lethal power in the 1971 war. Beyond these far and few examples there
is no empirical study to prove that all that we have bought from
abroad has been first class. All our assessments are largely based on
what the foreign vendors tell us and of course their reputation which
has been created more through sophisticated marketing efforts than
through their performance in an actual battle.
We need to invest more into research - focus on
building world class infrastructure and hire the best brains - besides
upgrading organisations like the DRDO. The ease with which we blame
our indigenous efforts has to stop. This is not to suggest that our
scientists don’t pull up their socks. Strategic defence planners and
analysts must ask simple questions - Why is it that we are still
struggling to produce a worthy gun? Or Western and Russian scientists
study scientific principles unknown to us Indians?
Our perspective planning must categorise items
which are immediately required to meet the contingencies in say J&K
and acquire them from abroad. Others that can wait must be developed
indigenously. But for all this to happen we need to think ‘jointly’.
Every service thinks that whatever it is projecting is of utmost
importance and hence its need must be met. If we aspire to play a more
meaningful global role, single service parochialism will have to give
way to a structured national defence planning.
Atul
Bhardwaj Editor Salute is a retired Naval officer. He can be contacted
at
atul.salute@gmail.com
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