CONSTRUCTIVE

STOP “OG” THINK “PURPLE”

COL (RETD) ALI AHMED

The fracas in South Block between the brass and bureaucrats over the VI Pay Commission recommendations for the services is well known. Having earlier implemented Phase I of the AV Singh Committee’s report regarding Lieutenant Colonels and below in 2004, Phase II was approved near simultaneously with the Pay Commission in Oct 2008. Thus even as the brass was to be expanded by 1051 posts, Lieutenant Colonels were placed in the III pay band. That the service chiefs held their ground is now folklore. However, the locus of the civil war has shifted to Sena Bhawan; as an unintended consequence of the AV Singh Committee report, it’s now within the Army over the distribution of the goodies.

The report managed to meet its mandate of improving career mobility and achieving combat effectiveness by bringing down the age profile of commanding officers. The Army determined that the additional vacancies would be as per the command billets at Colonel’s rank with each arm or service. Thus, the Infantry and Artillery, with higher numbers of battalion and regimental command assignments, ended up getting higher proportion of vacancies. Since the authorised officer strength of the Armoured and Mechanised units is higher and numbers of units are lower, the two cadres were at a disadvantage. This deepened their existing reservations of the system of selection for higher ranks in the general cadre which is based on pro rata vacancies.

A noted Army watcher, Rahul Bedi, has likened the vacancy based system in higher ranks, existing for about a decade now, to mandalisation of the service. Traditionally, and in other militaries, merit in open competition determined selection into general cadre. Now, it is only at the last selection board for the rank of Lieutenant General that is purely merit based. This results in narrowing of the field through attrition of better officers and implies lower quality at three star rank. Distribution of AV Singh Committee mandated additional vacancies being based on the pro rata criteria implies persistence with the original questionable principle.

While management of any heartburn can be left to the service, querying the principle of promotions to higher ranks is valid since the nation expects the best value for its money. In an age of jointness, in which the colour of the uniform ceases to matter, it is ante-diluvian that the colour of the lanyard continues to. In the general cadre, the expectation is that officers should be able to ‘think big’ and also ‘act big’. The pro rata principle amounts to tacitly admitting an inability to do so. The nation, beset with security concerns into the foreseeable future and on the cusp of great-power status, deserves better.

A more consequential problem that arises is that of turf protection and expansion. Since the size of the arm or service matters, then turf would trump other criteria of organisational good health, such as combat effectiveness. Take for instance a hypothetical circumstance of an improved situation in Kashmir. In case the government is to contemplate a down grading of the military prong of strategy, demilitarisation may result in the Army eventually requiring to down-size the Rashtriya Rifles. This would affect the ‘Infantry lobby’, since RR units are counted as its command preserve. Any such governmental consideration may then invite a negative input from the Army, based on turf preservation. Thus, a narrow, institutional-interest based input could hold up a measure of transformational consequences for the Kashmir conflict. Take another example. In light of nuclearisation, any review of the utility of strike corps should be based on the nature of the future battle field. However, there is a possibility that parochialisms as against any military rationale may end up as the decisive factor. Take the case of mountain strike divisions against an emerging Chinese threat. These would be Infantry and Artillery heavy; even while armoured strike corps face the threat of extinction.

Lastly, in case of civil war internal to the service, adjudication would be the ministry’s prerogative, a civilian’s call. This unthinkable possibility would no doubt spur the brass into addressing the issue expeditiously! The élan of the plains warrior needs restoration since on their showing is dependent the outcome of India’s new Cold Start doctrine. More importantly, making a general cadre and consigning cap badges to the attic would ready the Army to finally ‘think purple’.